谁的终结？福山与张维为对话“中国模式”

作者：弗朗西斯·福山、张维为 2011年11月1日观察者网 

福山主题演讲：
变动秩序中的中国与世界

我最近写了一本书叫做《政治秩序的起源》，内容是关于世界各地政治秩序的发展情况。我采用了比较观察的方法来写这本书。
我认为只有通过比较才可以来理解不同的社会，不同的政治制度。我尤其用了一个特殊的方式来看待中国，在我看来，中国的发展实际上在整个世界历史当中非常有意义，因为他的政治和政权是相当独特的。在西方，我们一般有一种典型的观察方法，我们把它叫做欧洲中心主义的观察方法。也就是说他们总是把欧洲的看成是规范的，而非欧洲的都是不规范的。在我看来，这样一种观察方法实际上忽略了一个事实，那就是，我们可以说中国比西方早1700到1800年就建立起一个相当具有现代性的政治架构。

那么我想我要用一种历史分析来向大家展示为什么中国的政治发展跟西方是不一样的，之后我要说明我对于中国模式的看法。我前面已经说了，我到这里来实际上是为了学习而不是为了训导，所以如果大家觉得我有错的话，可以随时指出来。

我想首先从世界上政治秩序发展的三大结构要素谈起。第一个要素是国家，这个国家是科层制的，或者说是一个等级架构的结构，它集中了权力，同时将权力使用于某一块区域加以统治。国家实际上具有一种强制的力量。那么一个现代国家是指什么呢？我所谓的现代主要是用了马克思?韦伯的概念，也就是说这个国家并不依赖于朋友或者家庭关系，也就是说不是任人唯亲，而是用一种非血缘性的关系来组织和治理。把所有的被统治者看成都是同质的公民，在统治者与被统治者之间是拉开距离的。以前的所有统治方式主要是依赖血缘关系或者是其他相近的关系统治，现代国家不是这样的。

第二个要素我们把它叫做法治，法治并不仅仅单纯是有法律，因为每个国家都有法律，法律不等于法治。法治意味着法律必须要代表一个社会的道德共识，它的权威要高于当时的行政权力。不管是总理、总统还是国王陛下，他们不可能随心所欲地进行统治。随心所欲就不是法治，法治意味着最高权力机构也必须遵守法律。

第三个要素有关政治问责制，也就是说政府必须感到有一种责任，对这个社会的公民拥有责任，他不能完全按照自己的利益来行动。我们知道在世界上有很多国家的统治者把政治当作是为自己发财或者为家庭发财的工具。这当然不是问责制的政府，问责制政府中的统治者具有很宽泛的义务，我们经常可以看到的就是，问责制实际总是跟民主制和自由选举联系在一起的。在美国或者西方世界都是这样理解的，当然我想政治问责制应该还要宽泛一些，比选举还要宽泛。

我想在欧洲最早出现的问责制就是英国17世纪出现的制度——统治者对当时的议会负责，实际上他们选出来的或者参与选举的人当时代表的人占总人口的10%都不到。我想对于中国而言，你们大家都看到这样一个事实——在很长时间里统治者是要靠一个道义性的共识来进行统治的。这意味着什么呢？这意味着政府并不是通过选举来获得统治的合法性，而是通过一个道义上的合法性来进行统治。也就是说这些统治者必须要接受有关的教育，赋于自己道义责任进行统治，这是中国意义上的问责制，所以叫做道义问责制。

首先是国家集中权力，然后是逐步的对国家权力进行限制。大家知道“历史的终结”，意味着我们最后就是要过渡到对于权力的限制，然后是对于人民要承担义务，即问责。我想第一个世界上公认的现代政权实际上是中国人缔造的。当时这个要在中国建立现代国家政权的动机，实际上跟欧洲要建立现代国家的动机是一致的——他们面临着军事竞争的压力。我想在春秋战国时代，当时中国存在着不同的政治势力，不同政治势力相互交战了大约700年，这种军事竞争导致最后产生了一种有现代意义的政权形式——为了征税，招募官员来负责征税，招募方式整个是按照任人唯贤而不是任人唯亲的标准。如果你要按照亲人关系来组织，可能就无法来打赢一场战争。

我们知道秦代的时候中国实现了统一，那个时候中国所有的政治制度看起来已经是相当现代了。当时的中国已经形成了相当现代的文官服务体系，那是有一个非常理性的架构。由官僚体系来统治一大片领土，从这个角度来说我认为这是一个伟大的历史成就，是中国做到的。但是对于这一点，世界范围人们普遍没有充分认识或者给予充分评价。这是公元前221年也就是大约2300年前发生的事情。当然，中国并没有发展出另外两种政治体制要素，这两种要素实际上主要是从宗教当中派生出来的，因为一般来说宗教承担着一个道义合法性来源的功能，也就是说在古代西方，神父与统治者是分开的，古代犹太教、伊斯兰教、印度教都是这样的。我想在所有这样的社会当中，你可以看到对于那些行政统治者，实际上都有一个法律（宗教）上的限制。但是中国的情况不一样，中国的历史传统中缺少一个外在于行政统治体系的宗教权力。这妨碍了中国现代问责制的产生，在西方却是不一样的。我们知道在欧洲中世纪一开始就出现了法治，因为当时有天主教的存在。甚至在现代欧洲政权出现之前，宗教力量就可以限制欧洲的国王、君主或者是其他相关的一些政治势力。

所以，我想这个制度起源于西方在一定程度上就是一种偶然现象，也就是说所有的欧洲中世纪封建国家都拥有这样一个体制，包括国家政权和很大一个国会或者议会的体制。国王要增加税负的话，必须要获得其他权力体系的同意。这个体系可以对国王权力形成足够的挑战，在英格兰，他们在内战中砍掉了一个国王的脑袋，然后又在1688年驱逐了国王詹姆士二世并以荷兰执政奥兰治代替，这就形成了议会问责制。英国就是如此发生了1688年到1689年的光荣革命。我们知道民主在西方就是产生于这样一种因果发展进程，在一定意义上可以说是非常偶然的。但这样的情况出现之后，慢慢的就有规律地发展，也就是说国家政权逐渐强大，然后对人民负责。然后国家又出现了商业化、资本的崛起等等直到工业化的发展，这是目前我们看到的格局，当然有另外的一些类型，但是总的来说我可以看到在欧洲是这样的发展，但在中国是按照另外一条线发展的。中国实际上是从两千多年前一直发展到现在，但是走了比较独特的道路。当然中国目前的统治集团是中国共产党，是马克思列宁主义，但在其他方面我们也可以看到中国的治理结构实际上与秦代建立的体系类似，也就是说有一个高质量的、中央化的、非亲属化的官僚体系，按照个人优异的素质来进行选拔。这就是有关历史的回顾。

第二，我讲一下中国模式包含着什么，它的优势和弱势是什么？现在我们同时能看到美国、欧洲和其他一些地方的民主制，包括他们的权力制衡体系。我们从各个角度看一下中国模式，中国模式意味着什么呢？中国的这个体系目前的实质到底是什么呢？我想我们可以看到的第一个特点，就是它是一个中央化的官僚体系的威权政权，这实际上是继承了历史遗产，也就是说政府内部有一个比较高的制度化水平。我们看到有一个比较大的官僚体系在对一个庞大的社会进行统治，然后在这样一个政府当中，问责制主要是往上的，也就是说对共产党负责，而不是说往下。当然，这在过去就是对于朝廷负责，现在是换了负责对象。

因为更上层的权力体系可以来惩罚你，所以你必须要负责，但对被统治的人民没有直接的关系。你还可以有一种程序上的问责制，也就是说通过一种民主的直接选举制度，比如美国的乔治?布什总统犯了很多错误，后来我们选了民主党的奥巴马，这就是通过民主选举贯彻问责制。在中国，问责主要是道义上的而不是程序上的。从这个角度来说道义问责制是指统治者在道义上感觉到对人民怀有责任。如果我们看一下，世界上一些成功推进现代化的维权政权，如果有成功的话，主要集中在东亚，比如说在南韩，还有陈水扁统治下的台湾，还有李光耀统治下的新加坡，还有非民主时代的日本，当然还有一个比较大的就是中华人民共和国。我想这些地方为什么成功，实际上是源于中国的儒家体系，这里面拥有道义的问责制，我们知道世界上有很多的威权政权，显然又不同于程序性的问责制。

中国模式的第二点就是经济方面的特点，我想在这个方面的话，中国实际上跟其他一些东亚快速发展的社会又是不一样的，我们知道中国的经济模式实际上主要是依赖于一个范围更宽的出口推动，而且是大规模的依赖于政府来推动这个工业化。这一点稍微不同于比如说日本曾经采用的产业政策或者韩国采用的产业政策。在中国这里并没有很清晰的，比如说集中于半导体或者造船、钢铁这样的产业政策。中国政府主要是致力于建造基础设施，然后提供金融信贷，还有管理它的汇率制度，然后使得出口具有竞争性，所以它并不是具体的选定哪些竞争者进行出口。所以中国在这个意义上是以一种推动发展的方式加入市场经济。

我想中国模式另外还有一个特点，那就是相对来说整个社会保障体系薄弱，尤其是跟欧洲和北欧比是薄弱的。也就是说在中国这里主要是促进就业，但在平衡富人救济贫民方面做的比较少，尽管共产党用的是马克思主义意识形态。我们知道基尼系数是经济学家用来衡量不平等状态的系数，实际上在以往一两代当中中国的基尼系数上升非常快。中国方面也认识到这是一个值得关注的事实，在上海这样的地区和中国的内部可以看到差异是很大的。跟北欧国家相比，实际上在他们那里有比较大的福利，可以支持穷困家庭。丹麦和挪威也是这样，相对来说中国模式在社会保障方面比较薄弱。

现在我们可以比较一下这样两种体制，或者说不同体制各自的优点和弱点。也就是说我们一方面可以看到中国模式，另一方面还有一个自由民主模式，由英、美、法、意以及其他民主国家代表，当然还有一些发展中国家，比如说印度用的也是这个自由民主制。在我看来中国模式有一些重要的优势，其中一个就是他的决策，如果你比较一下中印的话，我想对比是相当明显的。中国很能建设基础设施，比如非常庞大的机场、高铁——从上海到北京已经开通了高铁，还有桥梁和大坝等等，因为中国政府是中央化的，可以很快实施这样的项目。在印度，虽然印度处在雨带，所以人均对水电的需求或者说平均用电量没有中国多，但基础设施也没有中国这样好，为什么？因为印度有一个以法律为基础的民主政府，当中国在这里建立三峡大坝的时候，我们知道实际上还存在很多批评和反对，但这个大坝还是建起来了，政府就是可以按照自己的意思推进。但在印度，塔塔公司想在西部边疆建一个汽车厂，但是碰到很多抗议，包括工会、农民组织的反对，最后只好放弃，因为政治上的反对力量太强大了。

所以在一定意义上我们可以说在经济决策方面威权性的，也就是说中国政治制度的威权特性使得它拥有一定的优势。当然，我想在美国我们也有一个以法律为基础的社会和问责制，但是美国的决策表现没有印度那么糟糕，但实际上我们也面临着政治制度当中的一些问题，比如说我们有财政赤字，我想每一个专家都知道，这种趋势是不可持续的，由于最近的金融危机，我们的政府差点因此瘫痪了。民主党和共和党以及我们整个的制衡体系使得政府难以运作。

另外，我们的利益集团是非常强大的，他们能够阻止某些决策，虽然这些决策从整个社会长远利益来看是合理的，但是最后只好向一小部分利益集团低头，所以美国很难来解决这样的问题，但是，我们是否可以在以后几年当中改变，这是非常重要的。我们以此判断美国的民主制在长远上能不能成功。

中国有很多的优势，当然我不知道这样的优势在多大程度上是依赖于中国的历史，但毫无疑问我知道，在以往一代当中，中国人民实际上还是有比较自由的意识形态。政府实际也进行了很多创新，是对的就做是不对的就改。另一方面可以说美国政府实际在经济政策方面教条气很弄。虽然我们说美国非常务实，而且也愿意进行尝试，但实际上我可以说并不是那样。从这个角度来说，我想中国确实还拥有不少优势。但问题是，我们要问，这种优势的可持续性怎样。我们知道在全球金融危机之后中国做的不错，美国看起来好像并没有做得很好，我们现在还在赤字底下挣扎。但我们要问的问题是，哪个制度在往下二十年、三十年时间里可持续。从长远考虑我还是赞成美国制度多于赞成中国制度。当然待会儿张维为教授可能跟我要就此进行一些辩论。

这里有好几个问题，往下我们会看到中国政治制度有很值得关注的问题，第一个就是缺乏对下负责缺乏。如果你看一下中国历史上王朝循环的话，高度中央化的官僚体系往往无法获得足够的信息，不能够了解整个社会当中发生的事情，最后无法进行有效的管理，我想在这个官僚体系当中最后就是带来很多的腐败，难以进行良好的治理。在一定程度上，这样的问题在中国的体制当中还是存在的。今天我们可以看到有很多的机会可以来收集信息，我们有因特网，我们还有其他现代的技术，但是对于政府来说他们是否有足够的精力回应人民的要求，回应人民的感觉，以及尊重人们怎样来治理的意见，这实际上还是一个问题，所以我认为向下的负责制还要最终靠选举实现。因为领导人觉得自己的位置受到威胁，弄不好人们会不选他们，要不然他们就不会做恰当的事情，长远来看是这样。

第二点我想在中国体制当中目前不存在，但也是需要关注的。那就是传统中国当中“坏皇帝”的问题。毫无疑问，如果你有能干和训练有素的官僚，也就是说技术专家，接受过良好教育，又有为公众利益献身的精神，那么毫无疑问这样的政府至少短期内可以比民主政府更好，因为民主政府往往依靠民族主义或者政党联盟等等。我想中国的这个体系有一个不能解决的问题，那就是坏皇帝。中国过去碰到了这样的问题，如果有好皇帝还好，但问题是你并没有任何的制度保障坏皇帝不出现，或者出现坏皇帝但因为你没有问责制所以很难把他去掉。所以这是一个问题，你怎么来保证获得一个好皇帝，而且保证这样一个好皇帝总是一代一代的相承，这个也是我们一直没有把握的。

我想还有一个经济模式的问题，也就是说出口模式对于中国是好的，只要中国还是一个小的经济体那没问题，而且出口导向是赶超工业化国家的很好途径。但中国现在已经是世界第二大经济体，所以这样的出口导向制度是无法维持的。我们知道美国和欧洲这样靠信贷消费的模式也不可持续，我们知道现在整个金融危机已经表明这样的体系已经崩溃，往下还有一些其他问题，很大程度上就是中国的体系靠金融抑制，也就是说靠大家拼命的储蓄，而且这样的储蓄其实是失利的而不是得利的，而且也没有像市场运作那样达到比较高的效率。所以我想这样的经济模式长期来看一定要重新加以思考。

还有一点我想是道义方面的问题。这实际上跟什么相关呢？我想政府不单单要做出好的经济决策，即使一个政府可以提供长期的经济的增长，但是这本身也并不是政府最终的目的，即使有一个制度可以向公民提供物质方面的财富，但如果公民不能参与最后的分配过程，或者说不能获得足够的尊严的话，那就会出现问题。我想我们在中东北非的话看到这些威权政权就遭到严重的挑战。很大程度上就是因为人民要求获得尊严，最后政府受到巨大压力，甚至垮台。我想这一点在很大程度上在威权体制下能够加以解决。但是经过这样的事件，我要说的是我不认为两种不同模式必然一个好一个坏，我知道民主本身实际上也会变糟糕的。我要承认目前美国的民主制度也碰到很多问题，我们也需要解决很多问题，所以我待会儿期待着大家的讨论，期待着跟大家进行交流，同时也谢谢大家。

福山与张维为对话“中国模式”

张维为教授：首先非常感谢您的令人印象深刻的演讲。您对新的理念、新的发现都比较开放，也努力去理解中国，包括它的文化、历史、文明和它今天的发展模式，这一切都给我留下了深刻的印象。非常感谢您。我们现在可以开始对话了。如您不介意的话，请允许我转用中文发言，谢谢。

我想刚才福山先生的讲座以及他这本新书，实际上提到了几个关键问题，就是对中国模式的质疑：一个是问责制，一个是法治，一个是坏皇帝，一个是可持续性。我想就福山先生的观点做一个回应。因为我自己觉得实际上中国做了很有意思的努力，今天中国是世界上最大的政治、经济、社会、法律改革的实验室。刚才福山先生讲的这段话，使我想起了今年2月份的时候我在德国和《时代周刊》主编的对谈，也是谈中国模式。这个主编刚刚访问过上海，他说他觉得上海现在越来越像纽约，是不是可以说没有什么中国模式，而中国越来越学习和靠近美国模式？我就说：你这个问题问对了，因为上海是我的家乡我比较了解这个城市，我说你恐怕观察的还不够仔细，如果你观察得仔细一点，您会发现实际上上海在不少方面已经超越纽约了。上海的硬件全面超越纽约，无论是高铁、地铁、机场、码头甚至许多商业设施。更重要的是在一些软件的关键指标上，比如说人均寿命，上海比纽约高4岁，婴儿死亡率，上海比纽约低，社会治安上海比纽约好，女孩子晚上12点可以在街上散步。换句话说我想告诉这个德国学者，我说我们的眼光已经超越了美国模式，超越了西方模式。我们从西方学习了很多东西，现在还在学，以后还要学，但是呢，我们的眼光确实是超越了西方模式。从某种意义上来说，我们正在探索下一代的政治、经济、社会、法律制度，而中国的发达板块在这个方面在带头。下面我想针对福山先生对中国模式的几个质疑谈谈自己的看法。

第一个是问责制，福山先生介绍的主要是一种西方议会民主多党执政的政治问责制，我自己在西方生活了20年，我越来越感觉到这样一种问责制很难真正的问责，坦率的讲我觉得美国的政治制度的设计是前工业时代的产品，需要重大的政治改革，美国政治改革的任务不亚于中国。三权分立仅仅是在政治范围内相互制约，解决不了美国社会今天面临的主要问题，无法阻止金融危机的爆发。关键的关键是我觉得需要一种新的制约与平衡，我把它叫做政治力量、社会力量和资本力量之间的平衡，而美国这个三权分立的模式下，刚才福山教授也提到了有很多既得利益集团，比方说军火集团，他们的利益永远不会被侵犯。他们阻碍了美国进行很多必要的决策。所以我觉得从这个角度来讲，中国人今天探索的问责制，范围比美国这种问责制要广的多。我们有经济问责制，政治问责制，法律问责制，比如说我们的各级政府都有发展经济，创造就业的使命。如果你这个任务完成不好的话是不能晋升的。我读到诺贝尔经济学奖获得者克鲁格曼写的文章，他说美国在过去十年，经济增长为零，就业创造为零。我想在中国这个土地上走遍任何一个地方，找不到有这样记录的地方，都比这个要好，而且好不少。这是经济问责制的结果，当然我们也有我们的问题。

政治问责制，法律问责制也是这样的，就在我们开会的这个地方。这是静安区，静安区是上海在各方面工作做的总体上比较好的一个区。严格的讲它的许多硬件指标、软件指标都超过了纽约曼哈顿区，但是去年一场大火烧了一栋楼之后，我们实行了问责制，二、三十个官员和公司人员受到了政治和法律上的处罚。我反过来想，美国这么大的金融危机导致美国普通百姓的财产损失了平均五分之一到四分之一，但迄今为止三年过去了没有一个人承担政治责任、法律责任、经济责任。而且更麻烦的是那些造成金融危机的金融大鳄还可以照样心安理得的拿上千万，甚至上亿的奖金，美国老百姓愤怒，奥巴马总统气愤，但他们是根据他们的合同应该拿到的。这使我想到了福山教授提到的法治的问题。中国在推动法治建设，法治建设这方面还有很多可以改进的余地。但我们自己传统中的一些东西，我觉得是好的。比如说我们传统中有一个“天”的概念。这个“天”如果用今天的政治语言描述就是一个社会的整体的核心的利益和良心，这个是不能违背的。我们可能99.9%的事情要严格按照法律办，但我们一定要保留那块小小的空间，有一些问题涉及到“天”，涉及到社会核心的利益和良心的重大事件，我们保留在法治范围内进行政治处理的权利，否则就是法条主义。法条主义可以害死人，所以中国在创新法律制度时，想取得这样一种平衡。

另外，坏皇帝的问题。这个问题我觉得已经解决了，实际上在刚才的短片中也提到，我们退一万步讲，既使是中国历史上所谓的好皇帝和坏皇帝时代，我粗略算一下我们还是有七个朝代的历史比整个美利坚合众国历史还要长，整个西方的近代史也就是两三百年，当中经过多少的战争冲突，奴隶制度，两次世界大战等等，也不能保证现代西方这个制度可以持续下去，这是我们一会儿还可以讨论的问题。

我想这个坏皇帝的问题是怎么解决的，这是我们政治制度的创新。第一个是我们的最高领导人，不是世袭的，是靠政绩靠自己干出来的。第二，我们有非常严格的任期制，最高领导人也是两任。第三，现在是一个集体领导，集体领导意味着当中任何一个人如果观点明显地偏离大家共识的话是要被拉回来的。第四个，最关键的是我们有一个很强的历史传承，就是选贤任能。现在中国最高的精英决策团队或者说中共中央政治局常委的资历基本上是两任省部级的履历，中国一个省的规模相当于四到五个欧洲国家，治理好是不容易的。我们这个制度可能也有缺陷，但有一点是肯定的，不大可能选出像小布什总统这样低能的领导，也不会选出像菅直人首相这样的低能领导人，所以这是一整套体制，我现在倒是担心另外一个问题，不是中国坏皇帝的问题，而是美国的小布什问题。就是这个体制再这样发展下去，我真的担心美国下一届的选举，选出的可能还不如小布什。美国是个超级大国，其政策影响到全世界，所以这个问责制都会成为很大的问题。所以我觉得福山教授倒是可以解释一下怎样解决美国的小布什问题，八年在现代的社会是不得了的，小布什八年治国无方，美国国运直线下降，再来一个八年美国也赔不起。

可持续性的问题我是这样看，我自己在《中国震撼》这本新书中讲了一个概念叫文明型国家。文明型国家有一个自己发展的逻辑和规律，实际上有一个自己发展的周期的。像中国这样的发展周期，有时也可以用"朝代"概念来描述，一个周期平均是两三百年，这是数千年历史的规律，从这样的一种长期的大周期来看的话，我认为我们中国现在还在全面上升的初级阶段，所以我对中国的前景非常乐观，我20多年来一直是这个观点。

我的乐观来源于中国人喜欢讲的一个概念，就是"势"，这个势一旦形成了很难阻挡。反过来讲一样，19世纪明治维新的时候日本一下子就转过去了，中国就转不过去，这也可以说是一种惯性。我们的体制通过30多年的改革开放形成了一种新的势头，这种大势很难阻挡，会有逆流，会有相反方向的浪花，但改变不了这个"势"，这是它文明大周期的大结构。这是很多西方学者，以及我们国内倾向西方的自由派学者往往没有搞清楚的一点。他们预测中国崩溃的论调持续了20年，现在海外的中国崩溃论已经崩溃。中国国内还有唱衰自己的人，但我相信这种国内的中国崩溃论也将崩溃，而且不需要20年。

至于中国模式的持续性，刚才您提到中国过度依赖外贸的问题，实际上我们外贸依赖度这个数字是被夸大了。按照官方汇率来算的话，外贸占GDP比重很大，但是外贸是按照美元来算的，而其他GDP的内容是用人民币结算的，这样就产生了误差。再往前看，中国内需是世界上最大的。我们真正的快速城市化是从1998年刚刚开始，今后每年都有1500到2500万人变成城镇居民，这会创造巨大的内需，世界上发达国家的内需加在一起也达不到这种内需。

还有最后提到尊重个人价值的问题，我想在尊重个人价值这个问题上中国人和外国人没有太大差别。关键是我们有一种传统，叫作从整体出发的传统，西方则是从个体出发的传统。实际上我们在实现个人价值个人权利方面，采用中国的这种整体介入的方法，效果实际上比采用个体介入的方法要好，打个比方我把中国的方法叫做邓小平的方法，把印度的方法叫做特雷莎修女的方法。邓小平的做法使得近4亿的中国人已经脱贫，4亿的个人实现了更多的方方面面的价值。他可以上网，可以看彩色电视，可以开车在高速路上行走，可以在网上讨论各种各样的问题发表自己的看法。但印度的特雷莎修女感动了无数个人，还拿到了诺贝尔奖，但印度总体的贫困状况没有什么改观，你在上海20年看到的贫穷加在一起少于你在孟买一小时看到的贫穷。没法比。

对于后面提到的决策过程中百姓的参与。实际上我希望福山教授有机会到中国做一些调研，我打个比方，我们的决策民主，中国现在以五年为周期的五年计划的决策的过程：上上下下成千上万次的咨询，这种决策民主的质量西方没法比，我们是研究生水平，西方可能是本科生、初中生的水平，这是真正的决策民主。至于中东最近出现的动乱好像体现人们要自由，而我觉得最关键的问题，是那个地方的经济出现了大问题，我去过开罗，去过4次。20年前跟上海的距离大概是5年，现在比上海落后40年，一半的年轻人没有就业，不造反行吗？而且我自己对中东的了解使我得出这样的结论，西方千万不要太高兴，这会给美国的利益会带来很多的问题。现在叫中东的春天，我看不久就要变成中东的冬天。严格讲那个地区还没有成熟到中国的辛亥革命时期，所以路漫漫。出现什么样的问题什么样的结局我们会看到的。我暂时就讲这些。

福山教授：非常感谢您刚才提了不少的问题，我现在一个一个来回答。首先当你在比较政治体制的时候，你要做一个区分：一个是政策，另一个是体制。也就是说一方面是某些集体领导人拿出一些具体的政策，还有另一方面是一整套的体制。毫无疑问，美国的决策者以往是犯了一些错误。比如说伊拉克战争是一个大错误，这个使我们付出了沉重的代价。另外美国出了金融危机，这实际上是从华尔街开始的，在一定程度上我可以说它实际上是一种放任自由的市场意识形态导致的结果，是过度的消费包括房地产方面的过度扩张导致的问题。我想任何的政权都有可能犯政策错误，所以我并不认为民主的政权必然就会比威权政权犯更多的错误。实际上威权政权也有很大的问题，因为他们犯的错误将维持很长时间，而且无法来终结这样的领导人，最后代价很大。比如说你说中国好像是不会选出小布什这样坏的领导人，但也许讲出来有点难，小布什只是当了八年的总统，你如果看坏皇帝问题的话，我看中国领导人毛泽东在大跃进和文化大革命期间造成的破坏多么严重，对中国整个社会的最终破坏实际上比小布什带来的破坏大的多。你提到这样一些中国领导层制度上的特点，我要说，目前我当然认识到现在中国的领导集体他们是有很多优点，比如说中国有两期任制，如果说卡扎非或者穆巴拉克也这样做就好一些，可惜没有。还有就是讲到为了做出重大的决定需要有一个共识，之前是好的。为什么现在的政权能够采纳这样一些特点呢？因为有过文化大革命的教训，中国经历了这样的事情，一个人的喜怒哀乐给整个社会带来了巨大的破坏。最后共产党总结了教训，拿出了一些新的政策，或者说体制特点来避免以前的大问题。比如说限制领导人的任期。我当然充分认识到中国这方面做的好的地方，我想中国的制度虽然是一个威权制度，但确实也是高度制度化的，这点美国很多人确实没有认识到。确实中国也有很多制衡，但另一方面我们也要长远的看——

目前中国共产党内的这样的体制构成，实际上主要是依赖人们的脑子当中的记忆。也就是说现在还有很多人是经历过文革的，他们还有这样的记忆，实际上他们在中国现在还不能完全诚实地来讨论这段历史。你们并不在教育人们，特别是年轻人文革的教训。因为这些人实际上是没有经历过文革，很容易忘却。但问题就是当将来中国新的领导人他们没有文革经历的时候，他们没有那样的心理创伤，跟曾经在没有限制的独裁主义下生活过的人没法比的时候，他们还会自愿遵守目前政权当中一定的制衡规则吗？

所以，我想我们长远需要的是可持续的明确的制度，比如说制衡制度。因为我们不能单纯依赖一代人的记忆。因为这种活人的记忆如果不体现在制度当中就会消失，如果下一代人没有这样的记忆可能会再犯这样的错误。所以我想法治和民主制就是一种用来维系我们现在一些好的现实条件，让它能够跨代传承。这是对于坏皇帝问题的继续讨论，就这点我想回顾一下中国的历史。

我在书中提出的重要观点，就是我们实际上都有共同的人性。人性实际上倾向于让我们重视家庭，重视亲友、兄弟姐妹，尤其是重视孩子，以一种比较特殊主义的方式来对待我们的朋友，给他们提供照顾，实际上这是人类社会当中的一种本性，但是在政治制度当中我们不能这样做。我想中国的政治一旦有这个成就，就是创立了这样的政治制度，是高度制度化的。也就是说超越了血缘、亲友和个人关系的层面。

这样才很早建立了官僚制度，然后通过科举考试制度选举官僚，所以当时已经摆脱了单纯的谁影响力大谁好的制度。所以我想公元前一世纪汉代前期的时候，建立了这样的制度，但到了西汉末期，东汉的时候就崩溃了。当时发生了什么样的情况呢？因为当时的门阀制度，中国东晋出现的门阀制度，实际上三国时代已经开始出现了，所以我想汉代之后，因为原来的这样一套制度化的体制坠落了，所以后来大的望族接管了政权，所以原来一些相当超前的制度被破坏了，导致了中国的长期混乱。因此我对于美国目前的制度非常的担心。美国现在有很多的精英，他们可以很好的照顾他们的孩子而且让他们进入到很好的教育机构，然后来接手很高的社会地位。但这是这个制度当中比较坏的一个方面，当然中国还没到这个程度，但这也是中国制度当中的一个隐患。

你怎么可以来防止这样的精英垄断这个国家的政权，而不是靠选贤举能？如果靠亲友关系就非常可怕。在以往的十年当中，比如说中国共产党做得很好。但整个制度也有很多的腐败，而且后门流行，掌权者使自己的亲朋好友获得更多的利益，这是我们看到的状况。所以我想很重要的状况就是要建立向下问责制，这样就可以保证个人的关系不进入到我们的政治制度从而颠覆这个政治制度。所以我想这个问题实际上根本没有解决，所以你说的坏皇帝问题解决了，我觉得这个好像是暂时看起来解决了，但长远来看我想没有解决，这实际上是一个真正的问题，我们怎么来让这个制度能够按照它目前良好的状态延续下去。比如说再延续二、三十年，这是一个问题。我想这个还是要政治问责制解决的问题。我并不是要给美国辩护，我住在纽约我知道那里有很多的犯罪，有很多的问题。但至少在一个民主制度当中你犯了错误就有机会改正这样的错误，而且花一段时间就可以把它改正过来。

另外我还有一个关于美国的观察，我们经历了金融危机，像张教授说的谁也没有受惩罚这是很糟糕的，没有让那些带来金融危机的人被问责，为什么出了这样的问题呢？我想这个跟我们的民主政治制度没有什么大的关系，我们知道1930年代的时候曾经有一场更大的经济危机，最后美国选上了富兰克林?罗斯福总统，并逐步建立了一个套监管体系和福利国家。他们采取了很多重大改革措施，因为群众非常愤怒了。他们改正了原来大的政策错误，这就是对过去的问责，并且是依赖自身的制度改正错误。我想在以往几年当中危机足够大，决策者也缓解了一些问题，这个反过来使得需要改革的势头受到了遏制，这也是矛盾的方面。但我想毕竟我们看到在民主体系当中有这样的内在机制，还是可以改正错误的。所以我们要看长远，好像目前中国还是没有做到这一点。

张维为教授：我还是想稍微回应一下，我觉得各个国家的历史中都有一些不光彩的事情、做得不好的事情，中国历史上也是这样，我们的文革也好，大跃进也好都是一种悲剧，特别是文革我自己是经历过一部分，但是，我还是要讲每个国家都有这样的问题，美国过去有奴隶制度，有印第安人被杀光的历史，种族歧视制度还持续了很多年。福山教授认为美国是通过自身制度的努力改进的，实际上中国的文革也好大跃进也好，也是通过自己的制度改正的。实际上如何避免坏皇帝的问题，我们的体制已经解决了，现在不会出现一个强人扭转这个体制，不可能的。因为权力交接的制度已经形成了，而且是一种“选拔”加上有限范围的“选举”的制度。我觉得从我们探索未来政治制度的角度来看，这个模式可能会比光是靠选举制度要好。因为西方光是靠投票选举的制度，我用个词叫做“游戏民主”或者是“好莱坞民主”，谁上台无所谓，只要程序正确，你是个电影明星你是个演员你是个运动员，只要是知名人物，选上来就选上来了。而在国家治理上，中国人的观念很重要，就是选上来的必须是人才，这是中国人根深蒂固的观念。

另外我觉得谈到毛泽东主席，我想是这样的，我们一方面看到他确实犯了很严重的错误，但我们也要发现这样的现象，为什么到今天还是有这么多的中国的普通百姓，仍然很尊重毛泽东主席，我想一定是有一些事情上他做的是对的，甚至是非常对的。他的几个主要的贡献我们是无论如何不能否认的。一个是统一了整个的中国这么大的版图，第二个是解放妇女，第三个是土地改革，还有一些其他的贡献。所以我个人认为邓小平讲的三七开，我亲口听他讲过，我觉得还是比较公道的。我们也许跟西方的传统不太一样，西方是一种法律传统，我们是一种政治传统。另外中国通过三十年的改革开放，已经形成了一个相当稳定的中层结构，我把中国分成上层、中层、底层结构。这个结构形成之后不会形成毛泽东时期大范围的极端主义。这个在埃及可能会出现，因为他们没有中层结构，什么是中层结构，就是和现在的市场机制配套的中产阶层结构。这个是中国以后体制不走极端的一个重要的结构保证。

关于腐败问题，我想这个问题一定要纵向的和横向的比，中国腐败问题是比较严重，处理起来也不容易，但是从历史发展的纵向比较来看，所有的大国包括美国在内都经历过腐败增加的阶段，往往和现代化同时发生。您的老师亨廷顿先生就讲过，现代化最快的时候往往就是腐败增长最快的时候。最重要的原因是财富和资金增长，而监控体系的发展速度跟不上财富的增长，最终我们可以通过建立更好的监管体制和法治建设，把腐败降下来的。美国我也去过很多次，我觉得在这个体制下，要看你怎么界定腐败。我自己在《中国震撼》这本书里面提了一个观念，叫做“第二代腐败”。比如说金融危机，一个重要的原因现在大家都知道了，叫监管套利，也就是信用评级机构给你打高分而得到大量的利益，实际上我觉得金融危机里面有很严重的腐败问题。但美国的法律制度把这些问题叫做“道德风险”。我觉得美国如果把这一类问题作为腐败问题处理的话，恐怕效果会更好一些。你也可以横向的比较，我走了一百多个国家，实际上不管中国现在怎样抱怨自己的腐败问题，但和我们可比的国家，也就是人口在五千万以上，发展阶段相对比较类似的国家，印度也好，乌克兰也好，巴基斯坦也好，巴西也好，埃及也好，俄罗斯也好，他们的腐败都比中国严重。《透明国际》的评估也是这样的结果。我把中国看作百国之合，就是成百上千的国家慢慢整合起来。这样的国家没法搞西方的制度。看中国同样要分板块。我们的发达板块腐败相对较少。我在意大利做过访问学者，我觉得上海的腐败一定比意大利少，也比希腊少，这是肯定的。在意大利南部，黑社会通过民主制度合法化了。我20多年前去希腊这个国家，就是财政赤字居高不下，现在就破产了，要靠中国援助。我跟希腊朋友坦率地讲：我20年前到你们国家的时候，你们总理叫帕潘德利欧，现在还是叫帕潘德利欧，都是家族政治。经济就是高福利永远下不来，最后破产了。我开玩笑地说我们可以从上海或者重庆派一个团队帮你们治理国家。

所以我就想到民主制度的问题。我这个观点我自己还没有写出来，我正好和福山教授的观点相反，我认为不是历史的终结，而可能是历史终结论的终结（the end of the end of history）。从人类大历史的角度来看，西方这个制度在人类历史上可能只是昙花一现。为什么这样说，往前推2500年左右，当时在雅典有一些很小的城邦民主制度，最后被斯巴达打败了，之后两千多年“民主”这个词在西方基本上是一个贬义词，大致等同于“暴民政治”。近代西方国家在完成现代化之后，开始引入一人一票这样一种民主制度。

这种民主制度发展到今天，我觉得有几个大的问题实在是解决不了，第一个就是它基本没有“人才”的观念，就是治国谁都可以，只要是选上来的。这个问题就很严重了，像美国这样的国家也承担不起，小布什一弄就是八年，这样的损失是很大的问题。第二个问题是福利永远只能往上走，永远下不来。像中国这样进行银行改革、国企改革是不可能的。第三个问题是社会越来越难以整合，过去的西方发达国家还可以整合，大家用票决制，你51%票，我49%票，51%票就赢。但美国的社会现在也是一个分裂的社会，投票输的一方不认输，继续为难你。第四个问题我叫作低智商的民粹主义（simple-minded populism），不能为自己国家和社会的长远利益进行考虑，连美国这样的国家今天都面临这样一种危险。

所以我想起了1793年英国国王乔治三世派他的特使到中国来想要进行贸易，但我们当时的乾隆皇帝非常傲慢，他觉得当时的中国在世界上绝对是最好的，是十全十美的国家，不要向人家学习任何东西，是历史的终结。结果我们就一下子落后下来。我现在觉得西方很多人也是这样的心态，这样的心态是从西方的角度考虑，他们真的可以到中国来好好看一看，观察一下中国怎样在三十多年里面如何不停地进行改革，有些改革虽然很小，但是不停地进行。西方觉得它的制度还是最好的，实际上这个制度问题越来越多，西方民主的发源地，希腊已经破产了，英国的财政债务占GDP的90%，也接近破产了。所以今天我们总理正好访问英国，准备投资，英国人就非常高兴。关于美国，我自己做了一个简单的算数，“911”袭击损失了1万亿，两场不聪明的战争损失3万亿，金融危机损失了8万亿。美国现在的债务是10万亿到20万亿。换句话说如果没有美元国际货币垄断地位的话——这个地位也不是永久的，美国这个国家就已经破产了。我有个朋友是从上海出去的，不是说移民热嘛，就去了美国。我就给他算了一下，你看过去十年如果你待在上海，如果不是很麻木的话，你可能已经买了一套房子，你的财富可能增加了2到3倍，而美国赶上了金融危机，他换外汇损失了一大笔，金融危机又损失了四分之一的资产，这样下来想衣锦还乡都很困难了。中国崛起是一个大势，一个大国全面崛起，人类历史上没有看到过，这样的规模绝对不是一个小国家可以比的。西方的制度总体上在走下坡路，今天一些中国人还是开口闭口美国怎么样，至少对我们这样经常去美国的或者在欧洲生活过相当长时间的来说有点贻笑大方。我们应该平等地看待西方，哪些地方比我们好，哪些地方不如我们，哪些需要学习，哪些需要警醒，这种心态我觉得才是一种正常的心态。谢谢。

福山教授：我想再次强调的是，你必须要区分政策和体系。我们刚刚讲过短期的政策，确实有问题。我们说的是美国，在过去的一代当中，我们有很多的借款、借贷。但是我个人并不认为这是我们所说的民主的特性和体制的问题，我们看到的德国实际上和中国蛮接近的，为什么呢？它非常执著，执著于我们所说的贸易的顺差，而且它也是一个非常大的经济体，而且就业在德国也是不错的，同时我们看到德国没有很多美国的那种房产泡沫，他们也是一个民主的国家，只是他们做了一些跟美国不一样的选择。我想说这个国家是不是民主国家根本没有问题，每个国家都可以犯错误，也可以选择自己的短期的经济架构。

我们知道中国在上一代取得的成就真的是非常辉煌和巨大，我并没有说我不尊重这点，但是我还是想说的一点是你不能基于非常短期的的表现来做一个长期的评价。我们看到日本在1980年代末期的时候遭遇房产泡沫。当这个泡沫破碎的时候，我们才看到政策的错误，接下来就是日本20年的金融或者说经济的停滞不前，增长率非常低。我们知道1980年代中期的时候，日本变的越来越强大，似乎可以取代美国，我们看到当时有一个说法：称日本是一个超现实的国家，或者是超出了美国的国家。如果我们从一个长期的角度看日本的增长，最大的挑战是什么呢？对中国最大的挑战实际上对任何一个非成熟的体系都是一样的，我们会有这样一个周期。这个周期当中经济增长非常迅速，而且会有一个工业化的过程。我们看到了有城市化，进入到了工业化，欧洲这个阶段也是走的非常快，韩国、日本都是如此。可能差不多是25年前，中国已经实现了这个进程或者说流程，但是这样的转型的某一阶段，他会把很多人从农村解放出来，进入到一个经济体，接下来就有挑战了，也就是说我们所说的生产力发展到一定程度，你就进入到一个非常成熟的经济阶段当中，我想这是一个全球的规律，没有任何一个国家在这个阶段还能维持两位数的增长，不可能的。在中国也不可能，现在中国的增长在下一段应该会有所下跌。所有国家，尤其是所有亚洲国家一定会碰到我们所说的问题，我们看到了出生率的问题，这是一个非常大的压力，而且老年化的问题，意味着人口的寿命非常长，而婴儿的死亡率非常低，不管是新加坡、台湾等等，不单单是我们所说的独生子女的政策造成的，更大的原因是死亡率的下降。我在上海参加了另外一个会议，其中一位经济学家说到2040还是2050我们差不多有4亿人口超过60岁，这个挑战非常大，和其他发达国家面临的挑战是非常接近的或者说相似的。那我们所说的政治体系的柔性我们必须从长期的角度来看，尤其是看到了现在的挑战，不管是出生率下降，我们婴儿死亡率的下降还有老龄化的问题还有柔性的问题。这个情况下我并没有说民主的体系可以完全解决这个问题，我想这是每个国家都会遇到的问题。

另外还有一个问题，刚刚张教授还讲到了高度民粹主义，我们所说的民主并不是每次都能做出正确的选择。我相信我们有很多例子说明这个问题，美国的政治体系当中的很多东西，尤其是现在，对于一些很蠢的政治决定，有时候我真要摇头。但林肯，可以说我们美国最伟大的总统，有这么一名言：“你可以在一段时间欺骗所有人，也可以在所有时间欺骗一些人，但不可能在所有时间欺骗所有人。”尤其是我们所看到的国民的教育和收入正在增加和改善。我们看到民粹主义从某个角度来说已经改变了，我想这是真正的一个来测试民主的因素。确实短期当中我们有错误的选择、错误的决定，可能是历史的问题，可能是领导选错了等等。但现在的问题是什么呢？对于一个非常成熟的民主制度，他们有自由的言论权、评论权。从长期角度来说，人们最终还是会做出正确的抉择。我相信美国的历史，实际上可以讲到很多不好的短期的决定或者问题，但是，人们确实知道他们长期的利益是什么，他们的兴趣所在是什么，最后做出正确的决定。

当然，刚刚还讲到了一个问题，丘吉尔我们也知道是非常伟大的英国首相。他说民主，说相对于其他的制度民主是最好的政治体系了，现在的问题是你到底有什么可选的呢？如果有其他可选的高品质，而且是具有决定权的政体的话，就像我们讲过我说中国确实有，应该说上一代当中就是有。这可能就是一个更好的体系，但现在的问题是你如何来确保这样的一个引导，引导整个社会能够做出正确决定。现在我再回到刚刚张教授提到的问题，就是中产阶级的崛起，而且他讲这个情况已经去除了我们所说的投机和极端主义。

我的一位导师亨廷顿，他写过一本书叫做《变化社会中的政治秩序》，实际上我在斯坦福大学就是教这本书的。我们还讲过中东的问题。亨廷顿曾经讲过什么呢？他说革命并不是由穷人创造的，实际上我们所说的革命是由中产阶级来创造的。他们接受过很好的教育，而且他们有上升机会，但是他们的机会被屏蔽了，主要是被政治体系或者经济体系所屏蔽了，那么他们的期望和他们的能力，或者是社会提供机会的能力与这些期望之间的差异就形成了我们所说的革命。我们看到的中产阶级的付出或者是增加。在最近突尼斯、埃及发生了什么问题呢？我们所看到的是一个非常庞大的中产阶级，有很多人，很多的大学生，他们使用互联网。他们和外部世界相连，他们知道政府有多坏，对他们有多不公平。现在我们回到一个问题，就是中国未来的可持续发展。对此的挑战是什么呢？我相信农村贫穷的农民并不会造成政治斗争，我们知道一定是接受过很好教育的城市的中产阶级的人才会如此。他们希望能够和外部世界相联系，但是政治体系不让他们能够和外部世界进行联系，而且没有给他们社会地位或者是尊严，或者是他们认为他们应该得到的尊严。我们知道中国差不多每年都会产生600万到700万新的大学生，对你们来说最大的挑战是什么呢？并不是穷人，应该说更确切的是中产阶级，到底这个社会是否能够符合他们的需求和期望值。

讲到腐败，我实际并不认为民主制一定能解决腐败问题，我们看到有很多民主国家也有很高的腐败率。很多方面跟中国比的话，比中国更少。如果我们要遏制腐败或者跟腐败做斗争，其中一个重要的办法就是要让媒体能够自由地发表意见，也就是说让他们可以揭露腐败，而不用担心那些权位很高的人会来恐吓你，如果你有这样的自由媒体的话，那么我想毫无疑问是一个有效的遏制腐败的方式。我想在民主国家当中有时候并不总是这样，我们知道意大利总理拥有了大多数的媒体，这样就无法保证媒体自由表达了，尽管它是一个民主国家。反过来也证明如果这个媒体是高度自由的，在这样一个民主体制当中有充分的言论自由，你可以自由地批评任何政治高位的人士而不会害怕受报复，那我想可以充分地遏制腐败，我想这在自由民主制度当中是最容易做到的。谢谢。

张维为教授：谢谢福山先生。因为您刚才提到，要从长期的角度来评价短期的情况，实际上我1985年作为翻译陪中国领导人到美国去访问，见到基辛格先生，中国领导人请他谈谈对中美关系的看法。他说你们太客气了，你们是来自有数千年历史文明国家，还是你们先谈吧。当然他讲的是客气话，实际上我们不要忘记中国的整体实力也好，制度也好，我们在过去2000多年的历史上确实是领先的，直到启蒙运动，17、18世纪。我觉得福山先生这点很了不起，他和许多西方学者不一样的地方就是花了很多时间研究中国古代的政治制度，比如看到中国创造了现代国家制度。

我们在过去二三百年中落后了，现在是真地赶上来了，特别是我们的发达板块在很多方面已经赶上来了。我自己觉得西方恐怕有一点自满，他们还是没有真的用开放的心态来看。实际上我觉得中国很多做法西方真是可以借鉴，奥巴马总统倒是看到了这一点，最近多次讲过美国应该建高铁，应该重视基础教育，应该减少财政赤字，多储蓄，应该发展制造业，应该推动出口，他反复说美国不能成为世界第二，他是感到中国崛起对他的压力。

我自己觉得民粹这个问题，当然福山教授很乐观，认为美国会吸取经验教训，不被民粹主义左右。但我自己觉得随着现代媒体的出现，民粹主义似乎越来越严重，这是一个大的趋势。一个国家也好，一个社会也好，垮起来是很快的事情，不是简单的一个体制问题。我是这样的一个观点，我始终觉得像中国这样文明型的国家，什么东西都有自己数千年的传统，我不是说这个传统好还是坏，我是说一旦你有数千年传统的话，你要跟它一刀两断是很困难的，它会影响今天我们所做一切。所以我常说，你不想要中国特色也会有中国特色，因为你的传统基因太强了，所以要做的应该是趋利避害。在文革的时候我们曾经想要跟传统一刀两断，结果是非常的困难。中国有很好的传统，我觉得就是这种选贤任能的传统——通过考试来进行选拔，加上一定程度的选举。这个中国人能做好，我们有数千年的传统，所以历史传承跟西方差别很大。刚才福山教授提到，世界上除了民主制度之外还有没有其他的选择。这里有一个基本的分歧，就是中国人并不想把自己的制度推销给其他的人民或者其他国家。中国把自己的事情做好，把人类五分之一的事情办好，这已经是很了不起了。但我自己观察只要你做得好，人家就会来学习，今天中国所有的邻国或多或少都在学习中国模式，从俄罗斯到中亚到印度到越南、老挝、柬埔寨等等。关于中产阶级，这是亨廷顿的一个基本观点，是西方主流的观点，中产阶级会和政府形成一种对抗，我们国内一些喜欢西方观点的人也非常认同这个观点，建立独立的公民社会等等。

但我还是强调，中国有自己的文化传承，跟西方的文化传承很大的差别就是西方有一个传统观点，那就是“政府是必要的恶”。中国的传承不一样，中国的传承是“政府是必要的善”。有这样的历史基因的话，我自己估计，从现在的发展趋势来看，中国的中产阶级大概是世界上最希望中国稳定的。这是第一。第二，它跟国家的关系可能不是一种高度对抗的关系，而是一种高度良性互动的关系，这会使我们的社会我们的国家具有西方国家和社会远远没有的一种凝聚力。关于腐败问题，我是这样认为的，就是我们亚洲当时有“四小龙”：韩国、台湾、新加坡、香港。它们初步实现现代化以后，台湾和南朝鲜转向了西方民主制度，香港和新加坡基本保留了原来的制度，但从腐败情况来看的话，香港和新加坡比台湾和南朝鲜要好得多。国际上所有研究腐败的，认为亚洲腐败最少的就是香港和新加坡。特别是香港60年代腐败还非常严重，后来通过建立廉政公署等方法，也就是说相对比较独立的反腐体制解决的。所以说西方民主制度能够解决腐败问题这个说法我觉得不成立，至少在非西方国家是这样。我们可以看看国际上的腐败指数。绝大部分人口五千万以上的民主国家腐败都比中国严重，台湾民主化以后更严重，否则就不会有陈水扁关在监狱了。韩国几个总统都有腐败的问题，但是没有采用一人一票的香港、新加坡，通过自己的制度创新，把腐败降得比较低了。

最后就是前面您提到的丘吉尔讲过的一句名言，用中国人的话讲就是西方民主制度是最不坏的制度。我查了一下他讲这段话的历史背景，他是1947年在英国下院辩论时讲的，但他讲的语境是西方的民主制度。丘吉尔本身是反对在殖民地国家比如说印度推行民主制，他是坚定的反对印度独立的人，怎么会支持印度搞民主制度？我自己曾经套用这个比方，中国模式有很多的问题，但却是一个最不坏的模式。谢谢。

福山教授：就以这个问题开场吧，是否中国的中产阶级会不同于其他一些非华人社会的中产阶级，会不会真正出现这样的差异？我实际上跟我的老师做了很多的辩论。他在1990年代初写了《文明冲突论》，在这本书当中他说文化实际上决定了行为，也就是说我们在世界上看到了印度教、穆斯林、基督教，还有儒教这样不同的文明体系。虽然现代化带来了很大变革，但实际上在这些社会当中，人民的行为很大程度上还是受制于他们的文明形态，尽管他们处在现代的经济社会。为什么我要学国际政治？因为我喜欢观察不同的人，跟我不一样的人，如果说其他地方的人完全跟旧金山或者斯坦福的人一样，我就没兴趣学了。在这里有一个问题就是文化是否能够穿透很长的时间，是否能够影响到政治经济文化的各个方面？或者我们要问现代化是否最终能够导致人民在文化上也是趋同的？

我想我们来举个例子，你看一下这里有很多妇女坐在听众席当中，这是为什么？我们知道传统中国妇女的地位。在传统中国社会当中遗产主要是由男性继承，女性的机会是非常少的。我想在美国和欧洲早期发展阶段也是这样。但是你在这个发达世界、亚洲和欧洲可以看到到处是妇女，为什么是这样？为什么妇女的地位提高了？为什么她们现在在写字楼工作，在工厂做工？为什么她们拥有更大的社会和经济方面的跟男人平等的权利？因为这是现代化的产物嘛。过去很多人认为女性不可能在工作场合跟男性平等，她们只能在家里生养孩子，操持家务，但是现在的经济社会当中没有妇女的话很难运作。

沙特为什么能做到？实际上他们是从南亚雇佣劳力，比如雇佣50万驾驶员为女性开车，所以他们可以不准女性开车，但如果没有石油财富他们怎么做到这一点？虽然穆斯林的文化对女性有特别的规定，但现在在中东女性也获得了更大的权利，政治组织也更好了，她们也在要求跟男性平等的权利。所以这样再回头看，就充分地说明，不同的文化经过现代化也会对于同一个问题拿出共同的解决方案，比如涉及到妇女的不平等地位，就产生了相同的影响。因为现代化要求你虽然是文化背景不同，但要拿出共同的解决方案，所以我想如果你不给妇女平等的工作权利或者其他权利，你就不能达到一个现代社会的层次。当然这还是一个开放性的问题，张教授说好像是中产阶级他们有更好的教育，更好的财产，因为他们生活在中国的文化当中，所以中国的中产阶级肯定不同于其他国家的中产阶级。但在我的观察当中，从现代化的一些假定来看，中产阶级在世界不同的地区文化背景不同，但是他们在现代化上的行为还是类似的。很多人认为伊斯兰世界是不一样的，因为他们伊斯兰有不同的体系，但我们看到以往几年当中阿拉伯世界的妇女都走上了街头。也许文化可以决定某些行为，但我想在过去决定在现在可能不一定仍然有那么大的决定力，因为有了因特网，有了旅行，我想恐怕文化再这样那样垄断人们的行为是不大可能了，至少跟两千年前不一样了。因为人们确实需要获得外来的启示，现在新一代更容易做到这点。

最后我再讲一点就是我想我完全同意张教授的这个话，我认为确实有一个失败的地方，就是说在美国和欧洲他们没有充分认识到中国的成就。不管是当代的横向的比较取得的成就，还是历史纵向比较取得的成就。我想我最新的这本书实际上六章几乎有三章都是有关中国，比印度等其他文明讲得多的多，实际上为了写这本书我学了很多有关中国的历史。我想我充分地认识到，中国的传统有它强大的影响力。我意识到历史的影响力，这对于美国和中国都是重要的。我知道很多国家都可以从海外引进民主理念并把它融汇到他们自己的文明当中，我想中国也是这样，在走向现代性当中也是这样做，实际我很喜欢这一点，总是从外国学习，这一点我想中国还会继续做下去。我想这里的挑战是我们需要重新恢复历史文化的自豪感，但同时也要能够让他跟现代的制度能够相容，这很重要。要不然的话如果是单纯地对历史感到自豪，最后会走到民族沙文主义，或者是强烈的民族主义这样的心态当中，这样当然不是很好的。我想日本你可以看一下，现在日本是什么样的，实际上跟美国、英国、法国完全不一样的，有具体独特的日本的文化特色，确实这个特色是相当浓的。我想现在中国的特色的话，也应该是相当明显的，他一定是有明显的华人社会的特色，中国人的传统文化特色。我想重要的是我们要具体思考，什么方面的中国特色是我们要保留的，什么方面又是要融入世界潮流的，把这两点结合起来，才能与世界和平共处。

张维为教授：我再简单地做一个回应。现代化导致文化趋同，这是西方政治学的一个观点。但从经验角度来分析的话不一定靠得住。以中国为例，比如大家都以为中国人都在忙着现代化，忙着赚钱，突然前两年一首歌叫《常回家看看》，大家都在里面找到了感觉，这是非常具有中国文化传统的歌，美国人不会唱的。中国人传统的核心是家的概念，中国人为家庭会付出不知道比美国人大多少倍的牺牲。换句话说不管现代化发展到什么程度，一个民族的文化精髓，核心的东西是不会改变的，也不应该改变，否则世界就变得非常枯燥了，特别像中国这样一种强势文化，怎么改变得了？一个是麦当劳文化，一个是八大菜系文化，两者是完全不一样的。他不可能征服你，而是你要想办法收编他，这是我的一个基本的看法。我是很欣赏英国政治哲学家埃德蒙?伯克，他的观点一贯是任何制度的变更一定要从自己的传统来延伸而来。

我自己觉得，为什么我们尊重自己的文化，核心是文化底蕴的背后是智慧。智慧不等于知识。我们今天的知识比起过去不知道增加了多少倍，我们今天小学生的知识可能都超过了孔子超过了苏格拉底，但是智慧并没有增长多少。我想我有一个善意的建议，但福山教授不会接受，您讲的现代政治秩序的三个要素——国家、问责制和法治，恐怕上面还要加上一个“智慧”。比如说我观察美国，美国打了这么多仗，从战术上来讲，是赢的，但从战略上讲几乎都没有赢，实际上某种程度上是智慧的问题。越南战争是这样，阿富汗战争是这样，伊拉克战争也是这样，还有其他的战争，所以我觉得恐怕要更多地强调一些智慧的原因。

不久前我去德国讲课，一个德国经济学家跟我讲了一段故事，说最近默克尔总理问他，为什么德国没有世界一流的经济学家，没有诺贝尔经济学奖获得者？德国的经济学家说：总理呀，你不要担心，有一流的经济学家，就不会有一流的经济了。换句话说是经济学出了问题，出了很大的问题。在西方产生的社会科学中，我自己觉得经济学可能是相对而言更接近一点真理的科学，因为它最接近自然科学，什么都可以用数学模式来表示。坦率地讲，我觉得西方延伸出很多的社会科学，如政治学，跟经济学相比恐怕离真理更远，所以我们要大胆地探索话语的创新，这点我跟福山教授是一样的，他现在也在冲破传统的西方政治学的范围，从他这本新书就可以看到，他是用人类学、社会学、经济学、考古学等等综合地来探讨。我觉得这种努力很值得肯定，我也非常尊重，尽管一些观点我不完全同意。当然我自己也好，我认识的朋友也好，我们想做的事情是走得更加远一点，我们确实是在质疑整个西方的话语体系。我们觉得在这样的努力中，我们并不是要证明我们怎么好，西方怎么差，也不是希望西方证明他怎么好，我们怎么差。我是觉得我们需要有一种人类社会的努力来解决现在世界面临的巨大挑战，从消除贫困问题，到文明冲突问题，到气候变化问题，到城市化带来的弊病等等新的问题。西方的智慧确实不够用了，东方的智慧应该做出自己的贡献。谢谢大家。

The China Model: A Dialogue between Francis Fukuyama and Zhang Weiwei

New perspectives quarterly

Francis Fukuyama is a Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Standard University, and the author of The End of History and The Last Man and the Origins of Political Order. Zhang Weiwei is a professor at the Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations, a senior fellow at the Chunqiu Institute and a guest professor at Fudan University, China. He is the author of The China Wave: the Rise of a Civilizational State.

Francis Fukuyama | China is important in the world’s history in terms of the development of its state. In the West, the typical accounts of development of institutions tend to be very Euro-centric, taking the experience of European countries as the norm. They fail to recognize the fact that China was the first country to create a modern state 1,700 or 1,800 years earlier than in Europe.

There are three categories of political institutions in the world. The first institution is the state. The state is a hierarchical organization that concentrates and uses power to enforce rules in certain areas. The state is about the ability to coerce people. What is a modern state? I use the definition of Max Weber. The modern state is not based on friends and families. People should not be hired based on what relationship they have with the ruler. Rather they should be treated impersonally as citizens with a certain impersonal distance from the ruler as opposed to ancient states which were ruled on the basis of families or the kinship of rulers.

The second category of political institution is the rule of law. The rule of law is not just about having laws. Every country has its own laws, but laws must represent a moral consensus in the community that is higher than the will of whoever runs the state. So in other words, if the emperor, the president, the king or the prime minister makes up laws according to his own will, that is not the rule of law. The rule of law means even the highest authority in the country should abide by the laws.

The final set of political institutions has to do with political accountability whereby the government feels a responsibility towards its people as opposed to ruling purely in its own interests. There are many countries in the world where rulers regard countries as a means to enrich themselves and their families. That is not an accountable government. In the US and other Western countries, we associate accountability with democracy. Political accountability is broader than simply democratic elections.

The earliest form of accountability that emerged in Europe was in England in the 17th century. That was the accountability of the monarch to a parliament that only represented about 1 percent of the English population. This would not be qualified as democracy in any modern sense. But in China, I believe everyone knows the fact that you have had moral accountability, meaning that the government is not totally accountable through election, but feels a sense of responsibility to the public based on the education and training of the emperors/rulers. This is, I believe, the dominant understanding of accountability in China—moral accountability.

So states concentrate power, then the rule of law and political accountability set the limits. No matter how powerful a government is, it should be constrained by the rule of law and be held accountable to its people.

As I said, the first state in the world was created by China. The motive was actually the same as it was in Europe—the pressure of military competition. During the Spring-Autumn Period and Warring States Period in ancient Chinese history, you have multiple Chinese political entities fighting over 700 years. And that military competition forced the formation of modern political institutions. It required taxation, required recruiting officials to collect taxes and required promotion on merit. If you hired your family relatives and not the best military officers, you were not going to win the war.

Already at the time of the Qin Dynasty, the first dynasty that unified China, China already developed a state that looked remarkably modern. The civil servants examination was invented in due course. You had bureaucracy that was organized on rational lines and military forces in a large territory that were organized by unified rules. This creation of a modern state, created about 2,300 years ago in 221BC was a great historical achievement.

What China didn’t develop is the other two political institutions: rule of law and formal institutions of political accountability. The reason that China did not have the rule of law is that China did not have a dominant religion. I believe rule of law in most societies originated out of religion because religion usually serves as the source of moral rules that in many societies are administered by a separate legal hierarchy: judges, juries and priests. This was true in ancient Jewish Israel, in the Christian West, in Islam and in Hindu India. In all these societies you have legal constraints over the power of executives. However China did not have such independent religious support. That is not part of the Chinese tradition. So formal democratic accountability did not occur.

The West has developed quite differently. In the feudal time of Europe, it started with the rule of law. The Catholic Church devised the Code in the 11th century even before there was a modern European state. The European monarchs, like their counterparts in China, began to create centralized, bureaucratic powerful states in the 16th and 17th century. But they had to do so against the background of the prior existing legal constraints which limited their ability to concentrate power.

The origin of democracy in the West was the product of historical accidents. All feudal Medieval European countries had institutions called parliaments, diets or the sovereign court. These were the organizations that the King had to go to if he wanted to increase taxes. In England, the parliament was effectively strong and actually fought a civil war with the King. King James II was overthrown in 1688 and replaced with a monarch that was chosen by the Parliament. So the idea of accountability to an elected parliament really began with the Glorious Revolution of 1688. In many respects, the emergence of democracy in Europe was the result of this English development. That was, to some extent, remarkable. The rule of law and accountability turned out to be very powerful because they were the basis for the protection of property rights in England, the development of a powerful modern economy, the rise of capitalism and the industrial revolution.

These are the bases of the governing institutions we see today in the West. Obviously there are many differences between China and the West. Today China is ruled by the Communist Party whose doctrine is Marxism, not Confucian ideology. But in many other respects, the governance structure in China is very similar to the pattern established in the Qin Dynasty. High quality centralized bureaucratic government is built on impersonal recruitment and formal rules. That is the historical background.

Now let me talk about the China Model. How is it constituted? What are its strengths and weaknesses? What kind of system is the Chinese system? The first characteristic is a centralized, bureaucratic and authoritarian government. It’s legacy comes from earlier Chinese history in which there was high degree of institutionalization within the government and within a very complex bureaucracy ruling over an extremely large society. In today’s form of government, accountability goes upward primarily to the Communist Party instead of going to the Emperor. There is accountability in that system.

If you are an official and the government wants to punish you, they can hold you accountable. But there is no downward accountability to people who are being ruled. This contrasts with procedural accountability through democratic elections. That is modern democratic accountability.

Chinese accountability has been moral rather than procedural. Moral accountability means rulers feel morally accountable to their people. If you look around the world at the successful modernized authoritarian regimes, they are all clustered in East Asian countries such as South Korea, Taiwan under the Kuomintang, Singapore under Lee Kuan Yew, Japan in its early stage when democracy was not existent, and of course, The People’s Republic of China.

In other words, this kind of accountability is more or less confined to Chinese culture. In the Confucian way, there is a tradition of moral accountability. There are many authoritarian governments where rulers believe politics is about stealing wealth from other people and giving it to their families or friends. That is not the Chinese tradition.

The second element of the China Model is economic. Here I don’t think China is so much different from other fast-growing countries in East Asia. Like them, the China Model has been based on export orientation and relatively active government policies that promote industrialization. At the same time, it is a little bit different from policies implemented by Korea and Japan. In the Chinese case, industrial policies are less clearly targeted, for example, on semi-conductors, steel or ship-building. Generally speaking, the Chinese government is more focused on infrastructure facilities, financing, and a currency regime to make its exports more competitive rather than picking any particular winners in the economy. Nevertheless China has not been prone to rely on the market economy in its development.

The fourth element of the China Model is a relatively modest social safety net when compared with other developed countries, particularly those in Continental Europe or Scandinavia. China has tried to create a high level of employment, but started at a low level. More should have been done to help the poor and narrow the wealth gap despite the fact that China nominally remains a Marxist society. So one of the results is that Gini coefficient, which is used by economists to measure inequality, has been going up rapidly over the past few generations. Obviously the Chinese government recognizes this is a problem. The gap of living standards between cities like Shanghai and the interior areas is wide. Scandinavian countries such as Denmark and Norway are largely welfare states and support low-income families while China up to this stage has done little.

Now let’s compare these two sets of institutions and look at their own advantages and weaknesses respectively. One the one hand, we have the China Model. On the other hand there is the liberal democratic model which is represented by those democratic states including the UK, the US, France, Italy and of course some developing countries such as India.

The China Model has some key advantages, one of which is its decision-making processes. In this aspect, the difference between China and India is quite obvious. China is strong in building infrastructure facilities: large airports, high-speed railways, bridges and dams because the centralized government structure makes it faster to implement these projects. India, a country in the tropical zone, has abundant precipitation. However its hydropower infrastructure is nowhere close to China. Why? Because India is a law-based democratic government.

When China was building the Three Gorges Dam, there was a lot of opposition and criticism. But the government built the dam by its own will. By contrast, years ago, Tata Auto wanted to build a vehicle company in west Bangalore. There were strikes, protests and even lawsuits by trade unions and peasant organizations. The idea finally yielded to strong political opposition.

So in certain economic decision-making, the authoritarian Chinese system has its advantages. In the case of the US, we have a law-based government and formal democratic accountability. The US is not as bad as India in terms of decision-making, but we have our own problems in the political system, for example, the long-term fiscal deficits. Every expert knows that this is not sustainable and has been made even worse by the recent financial crisis, but our political system is largely paralyzed in doing anything about it by the confrontation between the Democrats and the Republicans.

Our interest groups are very powerful and capable of blocking some decisions. Although these decisions may be rational in the long term perspective, they are not taken in the end simply because of the opposition from some interest groups. It is a tough issue to be addressed in the US. Whether we can change this state of affairs over the next few years is important in judging whether the democratic system of the US can be successful in the long run.

China does have a lot of other advantages not particularly rooted in the Chinese history and culture. Compared with the last generation, the Chinese today are relatively free from ideology. The government has tried many innovations. If they work, it goes with them. If not, it drops them. Meanwhile the US government is actually rigid in making economic policies. Although the US is known for being pragmatic and willing to try new things, I actually don’t take that view.

So China does have many advantages. But the question is sustainability. After the financial crisis, China has done very well while the US doesn’t look good and is struggling with fiscal deficits. But which system is more sustainable in the next two to three decades? My preference is still for the American system rather than the Chinese system.

There are several issues that deserve our attention in the Chinese political system. Firstly, the lack of downward political accountability. If you look at the dynastic history in China you often see that a highly centralized bureaucratic system with insufficient information and knowledge of the society results in ineffective governance. What bureaucracy brings is corruption and bad governance. To some extent, this problem can still be observed in China today.

Of course there are many opportunities to collect information. For example we have the Internet and many other modern communication technologies. However it remains an issue whether the government is able to respond to popular requirements and feelings, and respect public opinion on governance. So, downward political accountability should be realized through elections so that leaders always have the sense of threat. If they don’t do the right thing, they won’t be elected.

The second issue is no longer existent in the current Chinese system, yet deserves attention. That is the “bad emperor” issue in traditional Chinese history. Undoubtedly, if you have competent and well-trained bureaucrats, or well-educated technical professionals who are dedicated to public interest, this kind of government is better than democratic government in the short term. Having a good emperor doesn’t guarantee no bad emperors will emerge. There is no accountability system to remove the bad emperor if there is one. How can you get a good emperor? How can you make sure good emperors will reproduce themselves generation after generation? There is no ready answer.

There is another problem of the economic model. The export-oriented model is good for China as long as China is a small economy. It is a great system to catch up with industrialized countries. Now China is the second largest economy in the world the export-oriented model simply cannot continue.

We know that the economic model based on consumer debt in the US and Europe is also not sustainable. This has proven to be true in the current financial crisis. There are other problems down the road. The Chinese system is heavily reliant on “financial repression”—in other words, high savings. However this fails to maximize market efficiency. So I think it is necessary to review this economic model in the long run.

The last point I want to make is morals. I think governments should do more than have the right economic policies. Even if a government can provide long-term economic growth, this is by no means its ultimate goal. The government has a moral requirement. Even if one system can provide material wealth to the citizens, if citizens cannot participate in wealth allocation or cannot get sufficient respect, problems will emerge. In the Middle East this Spring, we have seen a series of uprisings against authoritarian governments. This, to a large extent, is because people demand dignity. In the end I don’t think success belongs to only one model or the other. I am probably the first person to recognize that the US democratic system actually has a lot of problems that we have yet to solve.

ZHANG | In his presentation, Dr. Fukuyama raised four issues concerning the China Model, namely, accountability, rule of law, the “bad emperor” and sustainability. I would like to respond to Dr. Fukuyama’s view. I think what China has been doing is very interesting. China is now perhaps the world’s largest laboratory of political, economic, social and legal reforms in the world. What Dr. Fukuyama said reminds me of my conversation with the editor-in-chief of the German magazine Die Zeit last February. The topic was also the China Model. After a recent visit to Shanghai, he felt that there were more and more similarities between Shanghai and New York. In his eyes, China seems to follow the US model. “Does it mean there is no China Model but only the US model?” he asked. I counseled him to look at Shanghai more carefully and know the city well. A careful observer will find that Shanghai has overtaken New York in many respects.

Shanghai outperforms New York in terms of “hardware” such as high-speed trains, subways, airports, harbors and many commercial facilities, but also in terms of “software.” For instance, life expectancy in Shanghai is three to four years longer than New York, and the infant mortality rate in Shanghai is lower than New York. Shanghai is a much safer place where girls can stroll the streets at midnight. My message to this German scholar is that we’ve learned a lot from the West; we’re still learning from the West, and will continue to do so in the future, but it’s also true that we have indeed looked beyond the Western model or the US model. To a certain extent, we are exploring the political, economic, social and legal systems of the next generation. In this process, the more developed regions of China like Shanghai are taking the lead. Now I would like to share my views on Prof. Fukuyama’s doubts over the China Model.

First, with regard to accountability, what Prof. Fukuyama has discussed is the multi-party parliamentary democracy in the West. Having lived in the West for over two decades, I feel more than ever that this political accountability is hardly effective. Frankly speaking, from my point of view, the American political system is rooted in the pre-industrialization era, and the need for political reform in the US is as strong as in China, if not more. The separation of powers within the political domain alone can no longer effectively address the major problems in American society today; it certainly failed to prevent the recent financial crisis. To my mind, a modern society may need new types of checks and balances. It needs a balance between political, social and capital powers beyond the political domain. The separation of powers in the US has its weakness. As Prof. Fukuyama said, many vested interest groups, such as the so-called military-industrial complex, will never have their interests encroached upon, thus blocking many reform initiatives that are necessary for the US.

I think the accountability that the Chinese are exploring covers far wider areas than in the US. China’s experiment in this regard covers a whole range of economic, political and legal accountabilities. For example, our governments at all levels have the mission of promoting economic growth and job creation. An official cannot be promoted unless this mission is fulfilled. I read an article by Paul Krugman, the Nobel Laureate in economics, in which he said that economic growth and job creation were zero in the past decade in the US. There is no place in China, any province, city or county, in the past two decades that has ever registered such a poor record. On the contrary, economic performance across China is impressive. This is attributable to the Chinese practice of economic accountability. Of course, we have our own problems.

It is the same case with political and legal accountability. For example we are now having our dialogue here in the Jing’an District of Shanghai, which is one of the best districts in Shanghai. There was a fire accident last year that burned down a residential building in this district. As a result, twenty or so government officials and corporate executives were punished for their negligence of duty or malpractice. Such is the reality of China’s political and legal accountability.

In contrast, the financial crisis in the US has made American citizens lose one-fifth to one-quarter of their assets. Yet, three years have passed and nobody in the US has been held accountable politically, economically or legally. To make things worse, those financiers who are perhaps the culprits of the financial crisis are financially rewarded in tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars. However furious the American public and President Obama are, the bonuses are still awarded to them according to the contracts they signed in the name of rule of law.

This reminds me of the second issue concerning rule of law in the China Model raised by Prof. Fukuyama. We are promoting the rule of law in China, though there is indeed huge room for improvement. But I think some elements in our traditional philosophy remain valid and relevant. For example, there is the traditional concept of “tian” or “heaven,” which means the core interest and conscience of the Chinese society. This can by no means be violated. Laws may be applied strictly to 99.9% cases in China, but we maintain a small space where political solutions, within the framework of rule of law, are applied when “tian” or the core interest and conscience of the society are violated. In other words, the above-mentioned Wall Street bonus issue would not happen in China. So we try to strike a balance between rule of law and “tian,” and this is what China wants to do in its exploration of the legal regime of the next generation. Otherwise it is very likely to fall prey to what’s called fatiaozhuyi or excessive legalism, which could be very costly for a huge and complex society like China.

As for the “bad emperor” issue, it has been solved. To say the least, my rough estimate is that even during the times of “good and bad emperors” in China’s long history, there were at least seven dynasties which were longer than 250 years, in other words, longer than the entire history of the US. In fact, the entire contemporary history of the West is only about two to three hundred years and this history has witnessed slavery, fascism, tons of conflicts and two World Wars.

In my view, China’s political institutional innovation has solved the issue of the “bad emperor.” First and foremost, China’s top leadership is selected on merits, not heredity. Second, the term of office is strict and top leaders serve a maximum of two terms. Third, collective leadership is practiced, which means no single leader can prevail if he deviates too much from the group consensus. Last but not the least, meritocracy-based selection is a time-honored tradition in China, and top-level decision makers or the members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China, are selected with a criteria that usually requires two terms as provincial governors or ministers.

As you know, it is by no means easy to govern a Chinese province, which is usually the size of four to five European countries. This system may have its weakness, but one can be certain that with this system of meritocracy it is highly unlikely that China will elect a national leader as incompetent as George W. Bush or Naoto Kan of Japan. In fact, what concerns me now is not the “bad emperor” issue in China, rather it’s the “George W. Bush” issue in the US.

If the American political system continues as it is today, I am really concerned that the next elected US president could be even less competent than George W. Bush. As a superpower, American policies have global implications. So the lack of political leadership or accountability in the US could cause serious problems. I would like to have Prof. Fukuyama’s view on the “George W. Bush” issue. Bush did not run his country well and the US declined sharply for eight years running. Even a country like the US cannot afford another eight years of further decline.

With regard to the sustainability of the China Model, in my new book The China Wave, I put forward the concept of China as a unique civilizational state, which has its own logic and cycles of development, and the idea of “dynasties” is helpful here. A good dynasty in China tends to last two to three hundred years and more, and this logic has been observed in the past four thousand years. From this perspective, China now is still at the early stage of its current upward cycle. This is one reason why I am optimistic about the future of China.

My optimism also comes from the Chinese concept of shi or overall trend, which is hard to reverse once taking hold. The course of development took a sharp turn in Japan thanks to the Meiji Restoration in the late 19th century while China didn’t manage to do it due to China’s strong internal inertia, which is a negative way of saying shi. Now a new shi or overall trend has taken hold and gained a strong momentum after the three-decade-long reform and opening-up. This overall trend can hardly be reversed despite the fact that some waves may go in the opposite direction. It is the shi that defines the general trend of China’s big cycles. Unfortunately many Western scholars fail to understand that, and their pessimistic predictions about China’s collapse have lasted for about two decades. Instead of China’s collapse, these predictions have “collapsed.” Some Chinese within China still hold this pessimistic view. But I think this view will also “collapse,” and that won’t take another twenty years.

Prof. Fukuyama mentioned the trade dependency of the China Model. China indeed depends a lot on foreign trade, but this dependency has been somewhat inflated. Foreign trade takes a large share of GDP if calculated on the official exchange rate. But foreign trade is calculated in US dollars, and the rest of the GDP is calculated in the undervalued RMB. As a result, from my point of view, there is an exaggerated high trade dependency.

Looking ahead, China’s domestic demand may well become the world’s largest. China’s urbanization didn’t gather pace until 1998. From now on, there will be 15-25 million new urban dwellers every year in China. This unprecedented scale of urbanization in human history will create immense domestic demand, which may be larger than the combined demands of all the developed countries in the future.

In terms of respecting individual values, I don’t think there is a huge difference between China and the rest of the world. The end is the same, which is to respect and protect individual values and rights. But the difference lies in the means to achieve the end. China has a holistic tradition in contrast to the individualistic one in the West. The Chinese approach based on holistic tradition produces better results in promoting individual values and rights.

I describe the Chinese holistic approach as Deng Xiaoping’s approach and India’s individualistic approach as Mother Teresa’s approach. Deng Xiaoping’s approach has helped lift almost 400 million Chinese individuals out of poverty and fulfill their values and rights: they can watch color TVs, drive on highways and surf and blog on the Internet to comment on all kinds of issues. But in India, although Mother Teresa’s approach touched and moved countless individuals and she was even awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the overall picture of poverty in India remains largely unchanged.

I would also like to talk about public participation in the decision-making process. Actually I do hope that Prof. Fukuyama will have the opportunity to do more field research in China. What is the Chinese way of democratic decision-making? Let me share one example. In China, we make a national development plan every five years. This is the crystallization of tens of thousands of rounds of discussions and consultations at all levels of the Chinese state and society. In my opinion, this is the real democratic decision-making process, and it ensures quality decision making. The gap between the West and China in this regard is, to be frank, huge. To my mind, China is perhaps “at the graduate level” and the West perhaps at the “undergraduate” or even “high school level,” if this analogy fits.

The recent turmoil in the Middle East, at the first glance, is about the pursuit of freedom. But one of the root causes, to my mind, lies in the economy. I have been to Cairo four times. Twenty years ago, this city was about five years behind Shanghai. But now the difference is four decades. Half of the young generation is unemployed. Other than revolt, what else can they do?

My observations of the Middle East have led me to conclude that, while many in the West cheer the Arab Spring, don’t be too optimistic. I hope the region will do well, but it will be difficult, and the Arab Spring today may well turn into Arab Winter in the not too distant future with American interests undermined. The situation in this region is no better than that of China during the 1911 Revolution, which was followed by a long period of chaos. There remains a long journey to go in the Middle East. We shall wait and see what will happen.

Fukuyama | Let me respond one by one. First of all, when you are comparing political systems, I think you should distinguish policies and institutions. That is to say, the specific policies taken by certain leaders and the system as a whole. It is clear that American policy-makers have made a lot of mistakes, for example, the Iraq war for which we paid a big price. And the financial crisis which originated from Wall Street is the result of free market ideology, excessive household consumption and expansion in the property market. But policy mistakes can be made by any regime at any time. I don’t think democratic regimes are more prone to policy mistakes than authoritarian ones. In fact, the latter have even bigger troubles. The mistakes could drag on as the decision-makers cannot be removed. So the price at the end of the day will be very high.

You said that China will never select a national leader like George W. Bush. Well, it is a bit hard to say that. George W. Bush was the president only for eight years. If you go back to the “bad emperor” problem, the last bad emperor China had, quite frankly, was Mao Zedong. The damage during the Cultural Revolution upon the Chinese society was far more severe than anything George W. Bush did to American society.

You also mentioned several characteristics of the Chinese leadership. I do recognize the positive sides of collective leadership and the term limits for leaders in China. If Gaddafi or Mubarak had term limits, Libya and Egypt would not be in so much trouble.

You also said that consensus should be reached within the leadership in order to make important decisions. In my opinion, this practice is exactly a lesson learned from the Cultural Revolution. In the past, whims of one individual wreaked havoc upon the whole society. So the Communist Party had to create new institutions, which include term limits.

I want to give credit to the Chinese system. Many Americans fail to recognize the fact that, although China is an authoritarian country, it is also highly institutionalized and has checks and balances in its system. However I think we need to think about the long run.

The current institutional set-up within the Chinese Communist Party is based on the memory of those who lived through the Cultural Revolution. It is still not possible to talk about that part of the history fully in China. You are not teaching the younger generation what happened. They have not experienced the Cultural Revolution and tend to forget it. But the problem is what will happen if the new generation has no such experience and psychological scars from living under that kind of unconstrained dictatorship. Are they going to be willing to live with the current checks on the use of power?

That is why I believe the formal rule of law and checks and balances in the long run are viable because it is not just reliant on the memory of one generation. If the next generation doesn’t have the same memory, they might repeat the same mistakes. The rule of law and democracy are the means to maintain what is good at the moment and let it transcend generations.

In my new book, one of the things that I argue is that we all have a common human nature. That human nature makes us favor our families, friends, brothers, sisters and children. Giving our personal preference to friends and family is a natural mode of human social interaction. But we cannot base political systems on friends and families. So one of the greatest achievements of Chinese politics is to create a political system that is highly institutionalized beyond all friends and families, beyond kinship and personal relations.

So, in order to get into the civil service, you have to take exams. It is not just based on who is relatively influential. This system was fully institutionalized in the earlier Han Dynasty in the first century BC. But at the end of the late Han Dynasty in the third century, the political system was recaptured by elites, basically by families who had a lot of wealth and power. Then the period of Three Kingdoms was a very complicated period of Chinese history. Basically rich families recaptured power and the modern institutions based on meritocracy deteriorated. I think this could happen to any political system.

This is something I am worried about in the American system because we have elites who are very wealthy. They can take care of their children well and send them to very good schools. Of course this is not what is happening in China, but can be a threat in the Chinese system.

How do you make sure that elites who run the country remain based on merit and talent, as opposed to families and friends? I would say the Communist Party of China in the past few decades has done a very good job. However there is corruption in the whole system. People want to take care of their relatives, friends and children. I think one of the problems in a system without downward political accountability is sometimes it is hard to prevent the re-entry of these personal connections into the political system. That is a problem I don’t think has been really solved. But in the long run, in order to let the system perpetuate for two or three decades, I believe you need downward accountability to solve the problem. At least in a democratic system, if we make mistakes we can recover from them. Sometimes it takes quite a number of years.

Let me quickly talk about one observation about the US. We have experienced the financial crisis. As Professor Zhang said, nobody has been punished. I think that is terrible because we have not held accountable people who are responsible for the financial crisis. Why it happened is complicated. But I don’t think it has to do with our democratic political system. After all, in the 1930s we had an even bigger economic crisis and it led to the election of President Roosevelt and an entirely new welfare state and regulatory system. They took a lot of strong measures because people were angry about what had happened. So the system can produce real accountability in the face of big policy mistakes.

In some sense, I even think the problem in the last couple of years in the US is that this crisis was not big enough. So policy-makers actually, in a way, mitigated the crisis. So the political momentum that favors reform has been undermined. That is why we didn’t get adequate regulatory reform. But I don’t think our democratic system caused the current crisis.

ZHANG | Each country has ugly events or mistakes in its history, including China. The Cultural Revolution and Great Leap Forward are indeed tragedies. I have my own personal experience of the Cultural Revolution. But it is necessary to emphasize that no country is an exception. The US has a history of slavery and Indian massacres, and institutionalized racial discrimination lasted for over a century. Prof. Fukuyama thinks that mistakes are corrected by the American system itself. Likewise, the Cultural Revolution and Great Leap Forward have also been corrected by the Chinese system itself. The “bad emperor” issue has been solved by the Chinese system. Now it is unlikely that any single leader can reverse the institutional set-up because what has taken shape in China is a system of power transfer that combines selection with some kind of election. I think this hybrid model is probably better than the pure election in the West, especially from the perspective of exploring the next generation’s political system. What the West is practicing is increasingly an election system which I sometimes call “showbiz democracy” or “Hollywood democracy.” It’s more about showmanship than leadership. As long as the procedure is right, it doesn’t matter who is elected, whether a movie star or a professional athlete. Whereas, in the Chinese tradition of political governance, there is a very important idea: The country can only be run by people with talents and expertise selected on meritocracy. This is deeply rooted in the Chinese mind.

Prof. Fukuyama mentioned Chairman Mao. On the one hand, it’s true that he made serious mistakes. On the other hand, we should not neglect the fact that he is still widely respected in China, and this fact shows Mao must have done something right. It is not fair to deny his main achievements, which include, first, unifying a country as large as China; second, women’s liberation and third, land reform. Deng Xiaoping once said Chairman Mao’s achievements outweighed his mistakes by 70% to 30%. I myself heard him making this comment, and I think it’s a fair assessment. Perhaps this different perception of Mao has to do with the different cultural traditions: the Chinese have a tradition of political dynamics while the West has legal dynamics.

Thanks to the three-decade reform and opening-up, there has emerged a stable middle class. I divide the Chinese society into three layers of structure: upper, middle and lower. This structure can prevent large-scale extremism of the Mao era. Such extremism is still possible in countries like Egypt because of the lack of a middle layer. This is the structural reason why China is not likely to shift towards extremism.

With respect to corruption, I think we need to do what can be called “vertical” and “horizontal” comparisons. Corruption in China is serious and not all that easy to tackle. However reviewing world history, you will find that all major powers including the US experienced periods of rising corruption, which often coincided with the process of rapid modernization. As your teacher Samual Huntington observed, the fastest process of modernization is often accompanied by the fastest rising corruption. This is mainly due to the fact that the regulatory and supervisory regimes simply can not catch up with the growth of wealth and capital in times of rapid modernization. Eventually corruption in China will be tackled and solved through the establishment of better regulatory and supervisory institutions.

I have visited the US on many occasions and found that the definition of corruption matters a lot. In my new book, I put forward a concept of “corruption 2.0,” as the financial crisis has exposed many serious “corruption 2.0” issues. For instance, rating agencies gain profits through regulatory arbitrage by granting triple A’s to dubious financial products or institutions. I think this is corruption. But these issues are called “moral hazards” in the American legal system. I think the financial crisis can be better tackled if these problems are treated as corruption.

We can also make horizontal comparisons. I have visited more than one hundred countries. The reality is that no matter how much Chinese complain about corruption at home, it is much worse in other nations of comparable size, say, those with a population of 50 million and above, and at similar stage of development such as India, Ukraine, Pakistan, Brazil, Egypt and Russia. The evaluation of Transparency International echoes my view. 

Furthermore, it’s necessary to look at such a large country as China in terms of regions. China’s developed regions are more immune to corruption. I once stayed in Italy as a visiting professor and visited Greece several times, and I think Shanghai is definitely less corrupt than Italy and Greece. In Southern Italy, even the Mafia has been de facto legalized through the democratic system. I first went to Greece more than 20 years ago when its fiscal deficit was high. Now Greece is bankrupt and needs assistance. I said to my Greek friend very frankly: “Twenty years ago, your Prime Minister was Papandreou. Twenty years later, your Prime Minister is still a Papandreou. Your politics seems to be a few families’ business and the Greek economy goes bankrupt as a result of excessively high welfare system and poor governance.” I joked once that we could send a team from Shanghai or Chongqing to help Greece with good governance. Indeed, whatever political system, be it a one party system, a multi-party system, or a no party system, it must all boil down to good governance and what you can deliver to your people. Therefore, good governance matters most, rather than western-style democratization.

This brings me to Prof. Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis. I have not published my point of view yet. But mine is exactly the opposite to Prof. Fukuyama’s. I take the view that it is not the end of history, but the end of the end of history.

The Western democratic system might be only transitory in the long history of mankind. Why do I think so? Two thousand and five hundred years ago, some Greek city states like Athens, practiced democracy among its male citizens and later were defeated by Sparta. From then on, for over two thousand years, the word “democracy” basically carried the negative connotation, often equivalent to “mob politics.” The Western countries did not introduce one-person-one-vote system into their countries until their modernization process was completed.

But today, this kind of democratic system cannot solve the following big problems. First, there is no culture of “talent first.” Anyone who is elected can rule the country. This has become too costly and unaffordable even for a country like the US. Second, the welfare package can only go up, not down. Therefore it is impossible to launch such reforms as China did in its banking sector and state-owned enterprises. Thirdly, it is getting harder and harder to build social consensus within democratic countries. In the past, the winning party with 51% of votes could unite the whole society in the developed countries. Today American society is deeply divided and polarized. The losing party, instead of conceding defeat, continues to obstruct. Fourth, there is an issue of simple-minded populism which means that little consideration can be given to the long-term interest of a nation and society. Even countries like the US are running this risk.

In 1793, King George III of the UK sent his envoy to China to open bilateral trade. But Emperor Qianlong was so arrogant that he believed that China was the best country in the world. Therefore China did not need to learn anything from others. This is what defined the “end of history” then, and ever since China lagged behind. Now I observe a similar mindset in the West.

It is necessary to come to China and see with one’s own eyes how China has reformed itself over the past three decades. Small is each step, yet the journey is non-stop. The West still has strong faith in its own system, but it is the same system that has become more and more problematic. Greece, the cradle of Western democracy, has gone bankrupt. The British fiscal debt is as high as 90% of its GDP.

What about the US? I did a simple calculation. The 9/11 attack cost the US about $1 trillion, the two not-so-smart wars cost US about $3 trillion and the financial crisis about $8 trillion. Now the fiscal debts of the US are somewhere between $10 to 20 trillion. In other words, if the US dollar was not the main international reserve currency—this status may not last forever—the US would be bankrupt already.

The rise of China is what we call “shi” or an overall trend, the scale and speed of which is unprecedented in human history. My own feeling is that the Western system is trekking on a downward slope and in need of major repairs and reforms. Some Chinese always speak and think highly of the US model, but to someone who has lived in Europe and visited the US many times, this is a bit too simplistic and naive. One should be objective in comparing China and the Western countries. What are their strengths and weaknesses? What are our strengths and weaknesses, what is worthy of learning from the West or being mindful of? This is the right mindset.

Fukuyama | Again I want to say that you need to distinguish a political system from short-term policy. There is no question that the US, in the past generation, has had excessive borrowing. But I actually don’t think this is the problem of our democratic system.

Germany is very close to China. It is a large economy that has a consistent trade surplus and a relatively booming job market. At the same time, Germany has not been obsessed with the excessive financial innovation that brought down the US economy and caused the property bubble. It is a democratic country. It has just made choices different from the US. So I don’t think it has anything to do with whether this country is a democracy or not. Every country can make policy mistakes.

Again I want to put things into perspective. I really don’t want to belittle the great achievement that China has scored. However my point is that you cannot make long-term judgments according to short-term performance. Japan was unstoppable in the late 1980s before the burst of the Japanese property bubble. After the bubble burst and following policy mistakes, there has since been twenty years of economic stagnation and low growth. But people in the mid 1980s believed that Japan would grow larger and larger until it overtook the US. There was a belief of emerging Japanese supremacy. Now I think if you look at economic growth in a longer-term perspective, what is the bigger challenge for China is the same for any economy. There is at first a period of really rapid economic growth and industrialization that mobilizes people from the countryside to cities.

Europe grew rapidly at that stage, so did Korea and Japan. Perhaps 25 years ago, China entered this process. At a certain point, that transition got people out of the agricultural economy. Then you face the next challenge of productivity in a more mature economy. And I think it is probably a universal truth that no country has ever maintained double-digit growth up to that point where you have become an industrialized economy. That will happen to China as well.

The Chinese economy will slow in the next generation. All countries, in particular Asian countries, will face the problem because the birth rate is coming down, which is going to be a huge burden. The elderly population is large because of greater longevity and low infant mortality, not the one-child policy. This is true in Taiwan, Singapore and mainland China.

I attended a recent meeting where one of the economists said that in the year 2040 or 2050, China is going to have 400 million people over 60 years old. That is an enormous challenge that other developed countries face as well. So when we talk about the resilience of a political system, we have to think about the long term. Given the different upcoming challenges of falling birth rates and a much older population, how flexible can the system be? But I would not say democratic countries have all the answers. This is the challenge of everyone.

Professor Zhang also brought up the issue of populism, which means people do not always make right choices in democracies. I think there are many examples of this in American politics these days. Sometimes I have to shake my head because of some stupid decisions made by politicians. But Abraham Lincoln, I think the greatest president of the US, had a famous saying: “You can fool some of the people all of the time, all of the people some of the time, but you cannot fool all the people all of the time.” Particularly with the rise of education and income, I think this kind of populism in some respects has changed. This is a test of real democracy. Yes people in the short run make bad decisions or choose the wrong leaders. But in a mature democracy there is genuine freedom of expression and genuine ability to debate issues. In the long run, people will make the right decisions. I think in the history of the US we can point out many bad short-term decisions, but in the end people will come to understand their interests which will lead them to make the right decisions.

Winston Churchill, the great British Prime Minister, once said: “Democracy is the worst form of government except for all those others that have been tried.” I think it is important because the question is what you have as alternatives. The alternative is really high-quality authoritarian government, which I admit that China has had in the last generation. That may be a better system. But the question is how to guarantee that institution will guide the society to make the right decisions.

Professor Zhang also mentioned the rise of the middle class. He said that this rules out the possibility of populist extremism or insurgency.

One of my teachers was Samuel Huntington. He wrote a book in 1968 called Political Order in Changing Societies. One of the things that Samuel Huntington said is that revolutions are never created by poor people. They are actually created by the middle-class. They are created by people who are educated to have opportunities. But these opportunities are blocked by the political or economic system. It is the gap between their expectation and the ability of the system to accommodate their expectation that causes political instability. So the growth of middle class, I think, is not a guarantee against insurgencies, but a cause of insurgencies.

What happened in Egypt and Tunisian was the growth of a fairly large middle class, a lot of college graduates and a lot of people who use the Internet. Connected to the outside world, they were able to understand how bad their governments were.

In terms of the sustainable growth of China, I actually don’t think the source of China’s instability will come from the poor peasants in the countryside. Political revolutions are introduced by the educated middle class because the current political system prevents them from being connected with the larger outside world and doesn’t grant them the kind of social status that they deserve.

I know there are 6-7 million new college graduates every single year in China. One of the greatest challenges for stability is not the poor people in China, but whether the society is capable of meeting the expectations of the educated middle class.

In terms of corruption, I didn’t want to argue that democracies can better solve the question of corruption because obviously you have quite a few democracies with high levels of corruption. In many aspects, China may be less corrupt than many of these democratic countries. But I do think that one way of combating corruption is freedom of press where you have the ability to expose corruption without being concerned about possible coercion or threat. Granted, in democratic countries that is not always the case. For example, in Italy, the Prime Minister owns the whole media. But I do think it is an advantage to have freedom of speech whereby you actually can criticize those powerful people in the political hierarchy and don’t have to worry about personal retaliation. That is the advantage of having a liberal democratic system.

Zhang | Thank you, Prof. Fukuyama. You said that we should make evaluations in a longer timeframe. In 1985, I visited the US as an interpreter for a Chinese leader, and we met with Dr. Henry Kissinger. When he was asked to talk about Sino-US relations, he said he would rather listen to us first, because we came from a country of thousands of years of civilization. Of course this is a token of courtesy. However we should remember the fact that China was indeed a more advanced country than most in terms of national strength and its political system for most of the past 2000 years. I do want to give credit to Dr. Fukuyama, for what distinguishes him from many other Western scholars is that he has spent a lot of time and effort studying the political institutions of ancient China as evidenced by his observation that China established the world’s first modern state.

China lagged behind the West in the past two to three hundred years. But China is catching up fast, particularly in the more developed regions of China. I am afraid that the West is a bit too arrogant and fails to look at China with an open mind. To my mind, the West can already learn something from China. President Obama may be right, as he urged the US to build high-speed railways, focus on basic education, reduce fiscal deficits, have more savings, develop the manufacturing industry and ramp up the export sector. He has emphasized that the US cannot become the world’s No. 2. It is very obvious that he feels the pressure from the rise of China.

Prof. Fukuyama sounds optimistic on the issue of populism. He has great faith in the US that it can learn from its own mistakes, rather than being led by populism. But I tend to take the view that populism seems to have become even more widespread in the world today thanks to the modern media. Now a country or society in fact may crash overnight because of excessive populism, and this is more than an issue of political institutions.

In China, its thousands of years of traditions leave their marks on everything. I am not saying tradition is always good or bad. My point is that it is impossible or unrealistic to break away from one’s tradition as it always has an imprint on what we are doing today. Therefore I always say that like it or not, the Chinese characteristics are with us all the time because the Chinese historical genes are with us. What we can do is to leverage advantages of our traditions while avoiding whatever disadvantages of our traditions. What happened in the Cultural Revolution tells us that it is very difficult to break away from one’s tradition. China does have some very good traditions which include belief in meritocracy, so selection plus some form of election offers a promising future in China, and we can do well in this regard, given our thousands of years of experience in meritocracy-based selection.

Prof. Fukuyama talked about alternatives to democracy. This is exactly an area where our views differ. China does not have the intention to market its model as alternative for other peoples or countries. What we focus on is simply running our own country well, which means doing a good job for one-fifth of mankind, and nothing is better than achieving this goal. But it is also true that if you do well, others will follow your example. Today virtually all of China’s neighboring countries, from Russia to India, from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to the Central Asian nations are learning in one way or another from the China Model.

Professor Huntington’s view of the conflict between the middle class and the state is shared by most Western and some Chinese scholars who advocate an independent civil society. But China has its own long cultural traditions, which may impact China’s middle class in a different way. Most Westerners view government as a “necessary evil,” but most Chinese view government as a “necessary virtue.” With this cultural legacy, the Chinese middle class is more likely to become the staunchest supporter of China’s stability in the world. In addition, instead of being confrontational, the relationship between the middle class and the Chinese state is most likely to be positively interactive, rather than confrontational. This will generate a social cohesion in the Chinese society unmatched in any Western society.

Now I would like to talk about the issue of corruption. We all know Asia’s four Little Dragons: South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. After their modernization process was largely completed, Taiwan and South Korea adopted the Western political system while Singapore and Hong Kong chose to stay more or less the same course. Look at the situation today: Hong Kong and Singapore are much less corrupt than South Korea and Taiwan, as acknowledged by all those who study corruption. Hong Kong used to be very corrupt in the 1960s, but this problem was successfully tackled by setting up the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). In other words, the Western democratic system is by no means the best solution to the issue of corruption, at least in the non-Western world.

Transparency International’s corruption indicators show that most non-Western “democracies” with a population of 50 million and above are faced with more corruption at home than China. As a matter of fact, corruption has become even worse in Taiwan after it became a democracy. Otherwise Taiwan’s leader Chen Shui-bian would not end up in jail. South Korea’s five elected presidents were all implicated one after another in corruption scandals. In contrast, Hong Kong and Singapore, without adopting the Western political model, have succeeded in sharply reducing corruption through rule of law and institutional innovation.

As for Churchill’s remark about democracy, some Chinese re-phrased his remark into “democracy is the least bad system,” and I checked the context of his remark and found that he made it in a Westminster debate in 1947. He was clearly referring to the Western democracy as practiced in the West. Winston Churchill himself was firmly opposed to India’s independence. How could he be expected to support India’s adoption of Western-style democracy? But I myself have borrowed Winston Churchill’s phrase and described the China Model as the “least bad model,” which means it has its weaknesses, but it has performed better than other models.

Fukuyama | Let me start with the question of the middle class. Is the Chinese middle class different from the middle class of the non-Chinese societies? This is actually a question that I debated a lot with Professor Huntington. He wrote a book entitled Clash of Civilizations in 1990, in which he basically made the argument that culture determines behavior. Despite the changes brought by modernization, he argued, culture still determines people’s behavior even though they are more modern.

I believe culture is very important. The reason that I study international politics is that I like observing people who are different from myself. So cultural diversity is the reality and it is good that not everybody is the same. But one of the larger questions is whether culture really projects itself across time in a way that resists the process of political, social and economic development or whether the process of modernization leads to cultural convergence.

Let me give you one example. Look around the room in which there are a lot of women sitting. Why are there a lot of women in the audience? In traditional times, the status of women was low in the societies where inheritance usually went to the male line and opportunities for women were very limited. This was true in the US and Europe at their early stage of development. But when you travel around the developed world and here in East Asia, you see women everywhere. Why is that the case? Why have women’s status been raised? Why are they working in offices and factories? Why do they enjoy equal economic and social rights with men? The reason is the process of modernization. Today you cannot run a modern economy without women in the labor force.

Saudi Arabia doesn’t allow women to drive. So they have to employ around half a million chauffeurs from South Asia simply to drive their women around. If they didn’t have oil, this is probably the most insane economic system you could possibly imagine. Despite what Muslim culture says about the appropriate roles of women, women in the Middle East are getting more powerful and more politically organized. They are demanding equal rights with men. This seems to me a case where different cultures are coming up with similar solutions to the problem of the status of women. It happens not because culture is determinant, but because the modernization process forces societies to come up with solutions.

I don’t think you can have a modern society without granting equal rights to women. Of course this is an open question. Professor Zhang said that middle-class people who are educated, relatively secure and have private property are going to be different from middle-class people elsewhere because they live in a Chinese cultural system. Maybe that is the case.

But from my observation, middle-class people in different cultures actually behave in a similar way. In the Arab world, people think the Arabian people are different because of the influence of Islam. Yet through the past year the Arab people have been on the street to demonstrate against their governments. So I think that some of the assumptions about the role of culture may not be right. Maybe culture did dictate some behavior in the past. But under current conditions, it is different. With the Internet or travel, maybe people’s behavior is determined more by the needs and aspirations of the current generation than the weighty traditions of the past.

Let me say just one final thing on which I agree with Professor Zhang. I do think that there is a failure among the people in the US and Europe to appreciate Chinese achievement, both the contemporary and historical achievement. My recent book has six chapters out of which three are on China. There are more chapters on China than other parts of the world. I really spent a lot of time trying to teach myself as much Chinese history as I could. Recognizing the strength of that history is important for American and also for Chinese.

No civilization can live on borrowed values and institutions. What I perceive is going on right now in China is an attempt to recover authentic Chinese roots. I think this is a good thing that China has to do. The challenge is to recover that pride in history and tradition and make it compatible with modern institutions. We should do it in a way that doesn’t lead to nationalism or narrow chauvinism.

What is a modern Japan like? It is not similar with the US, UK or France. It has rich Japanese characteristics. I think a modern China needs to have very Chinese characteristics as well. So it is going to be a very important task to figure out what are typical Chinese characteristics and what is required of a modern society. That is also part of a larger international order. Only in this way can we live with others peacefully.

ZHANG | Many Western political scientists take the view that modernization leads to cultural convergence. But experience proves that it is not necessarily true. Let’s take China as an example. The Chinese are known to be busy with modernization, creating wealth and making money. But a few years ago, a song became an instant national hit that encouraged people to visit their parents more often. This song is heart-warming to most Chinese and it struck the chord of public sentiment. In other words, despite the rapid pace of modernization and the rise of individualism, at the core of the Chinese tradition is still family, for which most Chinese are willing to sacrifice much more than most Westerners.

The very essence of a culture is unlikely to be changed and shall not be changed by modernization. Otherwise the world would become too boring. How can it be possible to change the essence of a culture as strong as China’s? One is the McDonald’s culture, and the other is China’s Eight-Schools-of-Cuisine culture, and they are immensely different. Indeed, the former has no power to conquer the latter. Rather, the latter may be able to assimilate the former. I appreciate the views of Edmund Burke, the British political philosopher of the 19th century, who held that any change in a political system must be derived mainly from a nation’s own traditions.

Furthermore, I think, the main reason for respecting culture is our respect for the wisdom associated with culture. Wisdom and knowledge are two different things. We have far more knowledge today than anytime in the past. Our school kids today may have more knowledge than Confucius or Socrates. However human wisdom has hardly grown. Here I have a simple suggestion, which I’m not sure if Prof. Fukuyama will accept: in addition to the three elements of a modern political institution he has mentioned, namely, state, accountability and rule of law, we could add one more element—wisdom. The US has won many wars tactically, but lost them strategically, as the wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq, to name just a few, attest. This situation has to do with wisdom, and I think the importance of wisdom can hardly be overemphasized.

I was recently in Germany giving a lecture. One German economist told me a story. German Chancellor Angela Merkel asked a German economist why there are no first-class economists or Nobel laureates in economics in Germany. This economist replied, “Mme Chancellor, please don’t worry about this at all, because if there were first-class economists, there would be no first-class economy.” In other words, it’s economics that is in trouble. Among all social sciences invented in the West, I think economics is arguably the closest to the truth because it is more like natural sciences and supported by mathematical models. With this in mind, frankly speaking, political science and other social sciences invented in the West may well be further away from the truth than economics. This is why we should be bolder in our thinking and more courageous in our efforts toward innovative discourse.

I share one commonality with Prof. Fukuyama. We are both trying to work out of the box of the Western political science, and his new book tries to integrate anthropology, sociology, economics, archeology and more. His efforts merit our recognition and respect, though I don’t agree with him on everything. On our part, my colleagues and I are indeed moving a bit further than Prof. Fukuyama and we are questioning the whole range of the Western political discourse. But our intention is not to score political points or to prove how good China is or how bad the West is, or vice versa. Rather we try to find new ways to address such global challenges as poverty alleviation, the clash of civilizations, climate change and various problems associated with urbanization. Western wisdom is indeed insufficient. Chinese wisdom should make its contributions.